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Abstract6
This paper proposes a multi-demand negotiation model that takes the effect of human7
users’ psychological characteristics into consideration. Specifically, in our model each8
negotiating agent’s preference over its demands can be changed, according to human9
users’ attitudes to risk, patience and regret, during the course of a negotiation. And the10
change of preference structures is determined by fuzzy logic rules, which are elicited11
through our psychological experiments. The applicability of our model is illustrated12
by using our model to solve a problem of political negotiation between two countries.13
Moreover, we do lots of theoretical and empirical analyses to reveal some insights into14
our model. In addition, to compare our model with existing ones, we make a survey on15
fuzzy logic based negotiation, and discuss the similarities and differences between our16
negotiation model and various consensus models.17
Keywords: automated negotiation, fuzzy logic, bargaining game, preference, agent18
1. Introduction19
A negotiation problem is a communication process among a number of agents about20
how to allocate profit, goods, resources and so on among them [1, 2, 3]. It is one of21
the most common phenomena in our daily life [4]. Therefore, since Nash built the22
first mathematical model of negotiation [5], various models have been proposed in23
various areas, such as economics [6, 7, 8, 9], political science [10, 11, 12], manage-24
ment science [13, 14, 15], sociology [16, 17, 18], and especially artificial intelligence25
[1, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. In the area of artificial intelligence, most of the studies about26
negotiation focus on handling one demand with one or multiple attributes in continuous27
domains. There are many examples of this kind, such as how to divide a pie [24], nego-28
tiation in an accommodation renting scenario [2], wage negotiation between employ-29
ers and employees [25], negotiation of multiple dependent issues based on hypergraph30
utility [26], using BLGAN strategy and its extension for dealing with consecutively-31
conceding opponents [27] or multifarious opponents [28] in one-shot negotiation, find-32
ing agents’ optimal strategies in bilateral negotiation with uncertain information about33
˚Corresponding author
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one-sided uncertain reserve prices [29], trade-off making for generating counter of-34
fer [30, 31], and multi-strategy selection [32] in negotiation. The utility functions of35
demand in these examples are continuous.36
In contrast, little work deals with multiple demands in discrete domains. However,37
in real life it is very common that people negotiate multi-demand in discrete domains.38
For example, in a congress, different parties often bargain many political demands that39
are in discrete domains; in collective design problems, agreements must be reached by40
a group of stakeholders with different discrete demands; in a problem of real estate in-41
vestment, some investors demand to build large houses using environmentally friendly42
but expensive material, while some demand to build small houses using cheap mate-43
rials; and a group of friends want to organise a trip to a variety of places (the places44
are the demands in this case). Moreover, there are often many inconsistencies among45
different people concerned with different demands. In the problems of this kind, it is46
hard to elicit numerical utilities and then do quantitative analyses [33, 34].47
Moreover, most of negotiation models and systems just focus on the optimisation48
and stabilisation of a negotiation’s agreement, but ignore human users’ psycholog-49
ical characteristics [35, 36, 37, 38, 39] (although some studies [40, 41, 32, 4] did50
not). Nonetheless, sometimes it is necessary to reflect such human factors in nego-51
tiation models for a number of reasons. Firstly, a faithful negotiation model should52
also capture such aspects, i.e., the outcome or final decision should reflect users’ in-53
dividual emotions or affective factors, such as attitudes towards risk, patience and so54
on [42, 43, 44]. This is because a negotiating agent should accurately model its user,55
including the user’s preference, utility, way of thinking, emotion and so on; otherwise56
it is hard for the human user to delegate his negotiation task to the agent [45, 3]. Of57
course, if a user could choose the best negotiating agent to obtain the highest profit for58
him/her, it would not matter whether the user can be modelled well or not. However,59
the problem is: how can a user judge whether a negotiation system is the best or not?60
For example, in the domain of e-commerce, when a negotiating agent acts on behalf of61
a human, it is actually spending the money of its human owner. Thus, if the human user62
cannot judge whether the system is the best or not, the safest way is to let the agent be63
accurately aware of his interests, preferences and prejudices, and then do that job for64
him automatically to save him both time and energy as much as possible. Thus, in this65
way the deal made might not be better but at least not worse. Otherwise, it is not very66
possible for the human user to trust the agent and delegate his/her negotiation task to67
the computer system.68
For instance, in a negotiation for dividing 100 pounds between two, the fair solution69
is to give each 50 pounds. However, one who is greedy might feel unsatisfied with the70
solution, thinking he could get more if he holds his position more strongly during the71
course of the negotiation; while another, who would be satisfied with 40 pounds, might72
feel more than happy with 50 pounds. In this case, the greedy user, of course, wants73
the negotiating agent to reflect his greedy nature and to try his luck to get more than 5074
pounds. Actually, if the other side was satisfied with 40 pounds, the greedy one could75
get 60 pounds, and thus he will definitely not think the fair solution of 50 each is good.76
As a result, such a user would not delegate the negotiation task to a negotiating agent77
that can only gain 50 pounds for him/her.78
Also, some psychological experiments confirm that human factors play important79
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roles in negotiation. For example, Rothman and Northcraft discover that one human ne-80
gotiator’s expressed emotional ambivalence can foster integrative outcomes [46]. And81
Kleef et al. investigate the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotia-82
tions [47]. Their experiments show that participants make more concession to an angry83
opponent than to a happy one, because participants use the emotion information to84
identify the opponents’ limits and accordingly they adjust their demands. By using85
a hypothetical negotiation scenario and a computer-mediated negotiation simulation,86
Adam et al. find that expressing anger elicited larger concessions from European and87
American negotiators, but smaller concessions from Asian and Asian American nego-88
tiators [48]. Kleef et al. study more social effects of emotions in negotiation, such89
as disappointment, guilt, worry and regret [43]. They conducted several experiments90
in a computer-simulated negotiation. One experiment shows that participants make91
more concessions when the other displayed supplication emotions, and conceded less92
when the other displayed appeasement emotions (especially guilt). Another experiment93
shows that disappointment and guilt are moderated by the perceivers dispositional trust:94
negotiators with high trust conceded more to a disappointed counterpart than to a happy95
one, while those with low trust are unaffected. Hareli et al. implement an experiment96
to find two other factors relevant to negotiation: a negotiator’s power, and their coun-97
terparts’ emotional reaction to the negotiation [49]. Their findings show that at the98
beginning of a negotiation, the power is an important factor, but the informative value99
of emotion information takes precedence over time. Thus, when automated agents are100
employed to negotiate with people [50, 51] or train human negotiators [52, 53], it is101
necessary to put human personality traits into account in designing such negotiating102
agents [54, 55, 56].103
To address these problems, in this paper we develop a negotiation model, in which104
each negotiating agent has two preference orderings over his demands: one for reflect-105
ing its human user’s taste without considering any information about the negotiation,106
while the other for reflecting not only his user’s own taste but also his thinking about107
which demand should be insisted on or given up earlier. Thus, his attitude to risk can108
be tasted out by comparing the two preferences. Moreover, in our model, a negoti-109
ating agent’s preference can be changed during the course of a negotiation according110
to its user’s psychological factors about risk, patience and regret. Thus, a fuzzy logic111
system is employed to calculate the degree to which the preference should be changed112
dynamically as per these psychological factors during the course of a negotiation.113
Actually, the distinction between the two preferences is intuitive because in some114
negotiation processes negotiators choose to hide their real purpose and preference. For115
example, in a political negotiation, on the one hand, each party is in favour of policies116
(demands) that ensure their own supporters’ interest; on the other hand, they try their117
best to win votes or reach an agreement with other parties even though this may be at the118
price of policies they espoused. For example, a party has to latch onto environmental119
issues to win votes even though it prefers establishing new factories to getting more120
profit. This may form two kinds of preferences about policies: one is a negotiator’s121
real preference, and the other can be regarded as a strategic one for the negotiation.122
What is more, some empirical studies support our conjecture of distinguishing two123
kinds of demand preferences. In fact, Derlega et al. reveal that in hypothetical nego-124
tiation situations, international students from collectivism countries (e.g., China and125
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Japan) are more willing to make concessions when their opponent is an inside-group126
one (e.g., a friend) than an outside-group one (e.g., a stranger) [57]. In another sim-127
ulated selling-buying task [58], people in a cooperative relationship set lower selling128
prices, and thus are more willing to let their partners take possession of the object; but129
it is less likely for people in competitive relationships to do so. From these studies, we130
can clearly see that each negotiator could have two preferences: one reflects his own131
taste and the other reflects his thinking of his negotiating opponents.132
In short, the motivation of our negotiation system is three-fold. Firstly, most work133
on automated negotiation is in continuous domains, but discrete domains is in need.134
Secondly, on the one hand, existing negotiation models in discrete domains consider135
little about human factors’ influence upon automated negotiation although they are136
necessary; one the other hand, those studies that put human factors into consideration137
are not about negotiation in discrete domains. Thirdly, it might be not complete idea138
to change preference structure during negotiation, but it has been rarely implemented139
in any automated negotiation system in discrete domains. To address the problems of140
these three aspects, in this paper we present a method for automated multi-demand141
negotiation with dynamic preference structure over discrete domains by taking into142
account human-like negotiation factors such as risk, patience and regret.143
More specifically, our work advances the state of the art in the field of automated144
negotiation in the following aspects. (i) We introduce the concept of dynamic prefer-145
ence into negotiation models in discrete domains to reflect a negotiator’s adaptability146
during the course of a negotiation, so that negotiation success rate, efficiency and qual-147
ity can be increased significantly. (ii) We design a new algorithm for multi-demand148
negotiation, which works with public information of demand but private information149
about demand preferences that will be updated during the course of a negotiation. (iii)150
We identify, using lots of psychological experiments, a set of fuzzy logic rules which151
can be used to update negotiating agents’ preferences in each negotiation round accord-152
ing to their degree of regret, initial attitude to risk, and patience. (iv) We theoretically153
show how users’ psychological characteristics about regret, risk and patience influence154
their preference structures during the course of a multi-demand negotiation, and under155
which conditions an agreement can be reached. (v) We carry out computer simulation156
experiments to analyse the rationale for the choice of action function in our model, the157
influence of input parameters in the fuzzy system, as well as the negotiation success158
rate, efficiency and quality of our method. And (vi) to compare our model with existing159
ones, we make a survey on fuzzy logic based negotiation, and discuss the similarities160
and differences between our negotiation model and various consensus models.161
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines our negotiation162
model and its agreement concept. Section 3 presents our fuzzy logic system and the163
psychological experiment that elicits its fuzzy logic rules. Section 4 reveals some prop-164
erties of our model. Section 5 illustrates our model by a political example. Section 6165
presents our experimental analyses. Section 7 benchmarks our model with a previous166
one. Section 8 discusses the related work to confirm our contribution to the research167
field of automated negotiation. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper with future work.168
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Table 1: Key notational conventions
Notation Meaning
N the set of the players
Di the initial demand set of negotiating agent i
D˘i the conflicting demand set of negotiating agent i in Di
Dpλqi the demand set of negotiating agent i in λ-th round
Dp1,λqi the set of the demands that negotiating agent i prefers the most in round λ
DpHipλq,λqi the set of the demands that negotiating agent i prefers the least in round λ
d demand
L a propositional language
<p0qi negotiating agent i’s original demand preference ordering
<p1qi negotiating agent i’s initial dynamic demand preference ordering
<pλqi negotiating agent i’s dynamic demand preference ordering in the λ-th roundAi negotiating agent i’s action function
FLS a fuzzy logic system for calculating the preference change degree
G a negotiation procedure
Hipλq the height of the hierarchy of negotiating agent i in the λ-th round demand set
SCS the simultaneous concession solution
DSCS the dynamically simultaneous concession solution
ApGq the agreement of procedure G
AipGq the outcome of negotiating agent i
ADSCSpGq the agreement of procedure G by DSCS
ASCSpGq the agreement of procedure G by SCS
ϑi the regret degree of negotiating agent i
ρi the patience descent degree of negotiating agent i
γi the initial risk degree of negotiating agent i
ζi the preference change degree of negotiating agent i
nc,i the number of consistent demands of negotiating agent i in Di
npλqr,i the number of remaining consistent demands of bargainer i in the λ-th round
lipdq the level of d in agent i’s original preference hierarchy
lp1qi pdq the level of d in agent i’s initial dynamic preference hierarchy
lpλqi pdq the level of d in the dynamic preference hierarchy in the λ-th round
2. Negotiation model169
This section defines our negotiation model and its solution concept. For conve-170
nience, we summarise our main notational conventions in Table 1.171
Firstly, we recall the concept of a total pre-order [59]:172
Definition 1. Let < be a binary relation on a non-empty set D. Then < is a total173
pre-order on D if it satisfies the following properties:174
(i) completeness: @φ, ψ P D, φ < ψ or ψ < φ;175
(ii) reflexivity: @φ P D, φ < φ; and176
(iii) transitivity: @φ, ψ, θ P D, if φ < ψ and ψ < θ, then ψ < θ.177
Now we introduce the concept of our negotiation model as follows:178
Definition 2. The input of a negotiation is a tuple of pN, tDi,<p0qi ,<p1qi uiPNq, where:179
5
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(i) N “ t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nu is the set of all the negotiating agents;180
(ii) Di is the demand set of negotiating agent i, in which each demand is expressed in181
a propositional language, denoted as L, consisting of a finite set of literals;182
(iii) <p0qi is negotiating agent i’s original demand preference ordering, which is a total183
pre-order on Di; and184
(iv) <p1qi is negotiating agent i’s initial dynamic demand preference ordering, which185
is a total pre-order on Di.186
In the above definition, the negotiating agents’ demands are represented by logical187
literals, rather than compound statements with connectives t , _, ^, Ñ, Øu. This is188
because in real negotiation scenarios, it is more common and easier to express opinions189
on individual things than collective things. For instance, if a party’s position stands for190
two policies a and b, it is better to explain its attitude to these policies one by one,191
so that the voters can understand their propositions more clearly. Although a party192
could express a statement like a_ b, which means the party supports at least one of the193
policies, we do not take the compound statements into consideration in this paper, but194
our work can still cover the most common situations in real life.1195
In the above definition, we suppose that before a negotiation, each negotiating agent196
has two preference orderings over his demands: (i) the original one, which just reflects197
his own favourites in his mind without considering whether or not an agreement can198
be reached; and (ii) the initial dynamic one, which reflects not only his own taste but199
also his thinking about which demand should be given up earlier or insisted on during200
the negotiation. As we argued in the introduction section, some empirical studies (e.g.,201
[57, 58]) show that sometimes it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of demand pref-202
erences in negotiation: one reflects his own taste and the other reflects his thinking of203
his negotiating opponents.204
It should be noted that in this paper we just have an assumption that each agent205
has the knowledge of others’ demands and so what demands of it are inconsistent with206
others’ demands. However, they do not know how much an opponent prefers his/her207
demands. That is, they do not know the preferences of each other. This is because if an208
agent reveals its pref rence information, it will lose its competitive advantage on the209
opponent [60, 61, 62, 63] and so it should not do that.210
In the following, we will define the process of a negotiation of this kind. Firstly, we211
introduce the concept of a negotiating agent’s demand preference hierarchy as follows:212
Definition 3. Let pDpλqi ,<pλqi q be negotiating agent i’s dynamic preference structure in213
the λ-th round of negotiation, in which Dpλqi refers to the demand set of negotiating214
agent i in the λ-th round of negotiation and <pλqi refers to negotiating agent i’s dynamic215
demand preference ordering in the λ-th round. Particularly, <p1qi is negotiating agent216
1Of course, it may be worthy studying the situation of compound statements, but the issue is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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i’s initial dynamic demand preference ordering. Then tDp1,λqi , ¨ ¨ ¨ , DpHipλq,λqi u is called217
negotiating agent i’s demand preference hierarchy if @ j, k P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Hipλqu,218
(i) Dpλqi ,H;219
(ii) Dpλqi “ Dp1,λqi Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y DpHipλq,λqi ;220
(iii) Dp j,λqi X Dpk,λqi “ H if j , k;221
(iv) @di, d1i P Dp j,λqi , di <pλqi d1i and d1i <pλqi di;222
(v) @di P Dp j,λqi , d1i P Dpk,λqi , di <pλqi d1i if j ď k; and223
(vi) @ j ď Hip1q,Dp j,1qi ,H.224
Here Dp j,λqi is called the j-th level of negotiating agent i’s demand preference hierarchy225
in the λ-th round of negotiation, and Hipλq is called the height of the demand preference226
hierarchy of negotiating agent i in the λ-th round of negotiation. @d P Di, let lpλqi pdq227
denote the level of d in the dynamic preference hierarchy in the λ-th round.228
Clearly, in the above definition, the highest level is Dp1,λqi , and the lowest level is229
DpHipλq,λqi . In the following definition, in round λ, “move demand d
˘ down one or two230
levels” means to move d˘ from its current level in tDp1,λqi , ¨ ¨ ¨ , DpHipλq,λqi u down one231
or two levels.232
Definition 4. For each negotiating agent i, its negotiation processor is a tuple of pFLS ,233
A, Uq, where:234
(i) FLS is a fuzzy logic system for calculating the preference change degree.235
(ii) Ai is negotiating agents’ action function defined as follows:236
Aipζ, d˘i , λq“
$’’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’’%
move d˘i down two levels from its current level in round λ
if ζ ě τ1 ^ lpλqi pd˘i q ď Hip1q ´ 2,
move d˘i down one level from its current level in round λ
if pτ1 ą ζ ě τ2^ lpλqi pd˘q ď Hip1q ´ 1q_
pζ ě τ1 ^ lpλqi pd˘i q “ Hip1q ´ 1q,
do nothing
otherwise,
(1)
where ζ is the preference change degree, τ1 and τ2 are pre-determined thresholds,237
d˘i belongs to the set of the negotiating agent i’s conflicting demand set D
˘
i (in238
which each element d˘i is inconsistent with one demand d j of at least another239
negotiator, i.e., d˘i ^ d j Ñ K because d is a single atom), and λ means the λ-th240
round of the negotiation procedure.241
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(iii) Ui is negotiating agent i’s update function. Let the dynamic preference struc-242
tures of negotiating agent i in the λ-th and pλ+1)-th rounds be pDpλqi ,<pλqi q and243
pDpλ`1qi ,<pλ`1qi q, respectively. Then update function Ui is given by:244
pDpλ`1qi ,<pλ`1qi q “ UpDpλqi ,<pλqi q, (2)
where245
Dpλ`1qi “ Dpλqi ´ tdiu, (3)
where di is defined as follows:246
(a) if Ddi P DpHipλq,λqi
Ş
D˘i , then di P DpHipλq,λqi
Ş
D˘i such that @di P DpHipλq,λqi247 Ş
D˘i , l
p1q
i ppdiqq <p1qi lp1qi pdiq, and248
(b) if @di P DpHipλq,λqi
Ş
D˘i , then di P DpHipλq,λqi zD˘i ;249
and <pλ`1qi is defined as follows:250
(a) @di, d1i P Dp j,λ`1qi , di <pλ`1qi d1i and d1i <pλ`1qi di, and251
(b) @di P Dp j,λ`1qi , d1i P Dpk,λ`1qi , di ąpλ`1qi d1i if j ă k,252
where Dp j,λ`1qi and D
pk,λ`1q
i are in tDp1,λ`1qi , ¨ ¨ ¨ , DpHipλ`1q,λ`1qi u, which is ob-253
tained by applying action function (1) to tDp1,λqi , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,DpHipλq,λqi u.254
According to the above definition, after the λ-th round, the dynamic demand pref-255
erence structure of negotiating agent i, pDpλqi , <pλqi q, will be updated to a new one,256
pDpλ`1qi ,<pλ`1qi q, by a certain action chosen according to action function (1), where its257
input (i.e., preference change degree ζ) is determined by fuzzy logic system FLS (see258
Section 3 for the detailed discussion). More specifically, the updating consists of two259
key steps: (i) give up one demand by formula (3); and (ii) revise preference by action260
function (1).261
The reason why we choose function (1) is explained by experiments in Section 6.262
That is, if action function (1) is used in our fuzzy logic based model, it can guarantee263
not only a high success rate of negotiation but also a high efficiency when the numbers264
of conflicting demands and negotiating agents are increased. Moreover, the thresholds265
of the preference change degrees (i.e., τ1 and τ2) in function (1) are used to reflect the266
intuition that when a preference change degree is higher than τ1, it is high enough to267
make more change of the preference structure, while when a preference change degree268
is lower than τ2, it is low enough to make no change of the preference structure. The269
thresholds may be different from people to people and from problem to problem, so its270
elicitation will be a significant problem that needs to be tackled, but it is beyond the271
scope of this paper. However, in this paper, without losing generality, in the relevant272
calculation we just set τ1 “ 0.7 and τ2 “ 0.3 (a special setting of the thresholds of273
preference change degrees).274
A negotiation procedure consists of the negotiation input and process. Formally,275
we have:276
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Definition 5. A negotiation procedure is a tuple of pI, Pq, where:277
(i) I “ pN, tDi,<p0qi ,<p1qi uiPNq is the input of the negotiation; and278
(ii) P “ pFLS ,A,Uq is the negotiation processor of each agent.279
Generally speaking, an agreement should satisfy the intuitive properties as follows:280
(i) there are no conflicting demands in the agreement; and (ii) all the negotiating agents281
should accept all of each other’s demands when they have no conflicting demands with282
each other; (iii) there are no agreements when one of the negotiating agents cannot283
bargain any more because he gave up all his demands; and (iv) if after the λ-th round284
of negotiation all the demands of all the negotiating agents have become logically con-285
sistent, it is unnecessary to carry out any further concession. Formally, we have:286
Definition 6. For negotiation G “ pI, Pq, let negotiating agent i’s demand set in the287
λ-th round be Dpλqi . Then288
ApGq “
ď
iPN
Dpλqi (4)
is an agreement among all the negotiating agents of negotiation G if:289
(i) consistency: ApGq 0 K;290
(ii) collective-rationality: if
Ť
iPN Di 0 K, then @i P N, ApGq “
Ť
iPN Di;291
(iii) non-empty: @i P N, Dpλqi ,H; and292
(iv) minimum-concession: ApGq Y tdi, ¨ ¨ ¨ , d|N|u $ K, where di is the demand that293
agent i gives up after the pλ´ 1q-th round.294
In this paper, the concept of an agreement defined as the above is also called a295
dynamically simultaneous concession solution (DSCS) to reflect the nature that in each296
round each agent dynamically changes their preferences and at the same time concedes297
off one demand simultaneously.298
3. Fuzzy logic system299
This section will discuss our fuzzy logic system FLS. Specifically, we discuss first300
the input parameters of the fuzzy logic system, then we discuss the fuzzy variables301
used in the fuzzy rules, following by the psychological experiment for eliciting the302
fuzzy rules, and finally the fuzzy inference method. The reason why we use fuzzy rea-303
soning to represent the generation of preference change degree is that based on natural304
language it is conceptually easy to understand fuzzy logic. It is intuitive for users to305
express their reasoning about how their regret, patience and risk attitude influence their306
preference change degree through linguistic terms, rather than precise numbers.307
9
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3.1. Input parameters308
Our fuzzy logic system is used to calculate a degree to which a negotiating agent309
should change his preference. This calculation mainly depends on three human cog-310
nitive factors: regret degree, patience descent degree, and initial risk degree. In this311
subsection, we will discuss how to calculate the three parameters.312
3.1.1. Regret degree313
In Longman English Dictionary Online,2 regret is defined as “sadness that you feel314
about something, especially because you wish it had not happened”. Thus, in our prob-315
lem of multi-demand negotiation, when a negotiating agent regrets, it is because the316
agent gives up some preferred or consistent demands (which all the negotiating agents317
want). However, by our negotiation process, the effect of the first possibility is less318
obvious than the second one because negotiating agents give up the least preferred de-319
mands at the beginning. Thus, we can depict a negotiating agent’s regret degree through320
the second character. That is, (i) the more consistent demands a negotiating agent has321
given up, the more he regrets; (ii) if no consistent demands have been given up during322
a negotiation, the regret degree is the lowest; and (iii) if all consistent demands have323
been given up during the course of a negotiation, the regret degree is the highest. Thus,324
formally we have:325
Definition 7. Given a negotiation procedure G “ pI, Pq, let nc,i be the number of con-326
sistent demands of negotiating agent i in Di (consistent demands refer to the demands327
that have no contradiction with others’ demands), and npλqr,i be the number of remain-328
ing consistent demands of negotiating agent i after the λ-th round of negotiation. A329
function f pλqi is the regret degree function of negotiating agent i after λ-th round of330
negotiation if it satisfies:331
(i) if npλqr,i ě npλ
1q
r,i then f
pλq
i pnpλqr,i q ď f pλqi pnpλ
1q
r,i q;332
(ii) @npλqr,i , f pλqi pnpλqr,i q ě f pλqi pnc,iq; and333
(iii) @npλqr,i , f pλqi pnpλqr,i q ď f pλqi p0q.334
It is easy to check that given negotiation procedure G “ pI, Pq, the following for-335
mula defines a regret degree of negotiating agent i after the λ-th round:336
ϑ
pλq
i pnpλqr,i q “
nc,i ´ npλqr,i
nc,i
. (5)
3.1.2. Patience descent degree337
In Longman English Dictionary Online, patience is defined as: (i) “the ability to338
continue waiting or doing something for a long time without becoming angry or anx-339
ious”; and (ii) “the ability to accept trouble and other people’s annoying behaviour340
2http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/regret 2
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Figure 1: Three patience descent degree functions
without complaining or becoming angry”. Thus, the calculation of patience descent341
degree should reflect the phenomenon that in real life, when a thing is going on, the342
more time is spent, the less patient the persons involved will become. Therefore, if we343
use patience descent degree (ρ) to represent how much the patience of a negotiating344
agent will be after every round of a negotiation, it should reflect: (i) the more rounds345
completed, the less patient a negotiating agent; (ii) at the beginning of a negotiation, a346
negotiating agent is the most patient; and (iii) at the end of a negotiation, a negotiating347
agent is the most impatient. Thus, formally we have:348
Definition 8. A function fi is the patience descent degree function of negotiating agent349
i if it satisfies:350
(i) @λ, ω ď |Di|, if λ ď ω then fipλq ď fipωq;351
(ii) @λ ď |Di|, fipλq ě fip0q; and352
(iii) @λ ď |Di|, fipλq ď fip|Di|q,353
where |Di| is the number of negotiating agent i’s demands.354
It is easy to check that given negotiation procedure G “ pI, Pq, the patience descent355
degree of negotiating agent i after the λ-th round can be calculated in the following356
three ways:357
ρipλq “ λ|Di| , (6)
ρipλq “
a
λp2|Di| ´ λq
|Di| , (7)
ρipλq “ 1´
a|Di|2 ´ λ2
|Di| , (8)
where λ is the number of completed rounds of negotiation and Di is negotiating agent358
i’s demand set.359
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The difference among formulas (6)-(8) is in the aspects of the descent rates of pa-360
tience. Formula (6) reflects that a negotiating agent’s patience declines in a constant361
speed during a negotiation. Formula (7) reflects that a negotiating agent’s patience de-362
clines swiftly first and then slows down during a negotiation. And formula (8) reflects363
the reverse situation, i.e., a negotiating agent’s patience declines slowly and speeds364
up during a negotiation. For example, Figure 1 shows the difference among the three365
patience descent degree functions in the case of |Di| “ 5.366
3.1.3. Initial risk degree367
In Longman English Dictionary Online, risk is defined as “the possibility that some-368
thing bad, unpleasant, or dangerous may happen”. Therefore, we can assume: (i) if a369
negotiating agent has a high risk attitude, it will put all the conflicting demands at370
the top level of its preference hierarchy because by the simultaneous concession in371
our negotiation process, it may get most of its conflicting demands if its opponent is372
risk-averse, but it may break the negotiation if its opponent is risk-seeking; (ii) on the373
contrary, it can show its low risk attitude when it puts all its conflicting demands at374
the lowest level of its initial dynamic preference hierarchy; (iii) if it does not change375
the preference, it is risk neutral; (iv) if a negotiating agent moves up one of its con-376
flicting demands but keeps others unchanged, it shows a higher degree of risk; and377
(v) if a negotiating agent moves down one of its conflicting demands but keeps others378
unchanged, it shows a lower degree of risk. Thus, formally we have:379
Definition 9. Given a negotiation procedure G “ pI, Pq, let Li “ tmapping li : Di Ñ380
Nu and Lp1qi “ tmapping lp1qi : Di Ñ Nu be the sets of all the possible original prefer-381
ence hierarchies of agent i and all the possible initial dynamic preference hierarchies382
of agent i, respectively. Then @d P Di, @li P Li, @lp1qi P Lp1qi , lipdq and lp1qi pdq denote383
the level of d in an original preference hierarchy and an initial dynamic preference384
hierarchy, respectively. A function fi is the initial risk degree function of negotiating385
agent i with respect to lp1qi if it satisfies:386
(i) if @d˘i, j P D˘i , lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq “ 1, then @lp1qi , lp1q
1
i , fiplp1q
1
i pdqq ě fiplp1qi pdqq;387
(ii) if @d˘i, j P D˘i , lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq “ Hi, then @lp1qi , lp1q
1
i fiplp1q
1
i pdqq ď fiplp1qi pdqq;388
(iii) if @d˘i, j P D˘i , lp1qi pd˘i, jq “ lipd˘i, jq, maxt fiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u , 0 and389
mint fiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u , 0, then390
fiplp1qi pdqq “
maxt fiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u `mint fiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u
2
;
(iv) if Dd1˘i, j P D˘i , lp1qi pd
1˘
i, j q ă lp1q
1
i pd
1˘
i, j q, @d˘i, j P D˘i , d˘i, j , d
1˘
i, j , l
p1q
i pd˘i, jq “ lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq,391
then fiplp1qi pdqq ą fiplp1q
1
i pdqq; and392
(v) if Dd1˘i, j P D˘i , lp1qi pd
1˘
i, j q ą lp1q
1
i pd
1˘
i, j q, and @d˘i, j P D˘i , d˘i, j , d
1˘
i, j , l
p1q
i pd˘i, jq “393
lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq, then fiplp1qi pdqq ă fiplp1q
1
i pdqq.394
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In the above definition, actually lp1qi represents an initial dynamic preference hier-395
archy of agent i, and the difference between lp1qi and l
p1q1
i is that agent i maps different396
preference levels to its demands in the initial dynamic preference hierarchy. The idea397
of evaluating a negotiating agent’s risk degree is to compare its initial dynamic pref-398
erence hierarchy to the original preference hierarchy. The basic assumption is that if399
the more a negotiating agent insists on conflicting but unimportant demands, the more400
risk-seeking it is; and if the more a negotiation agent concedes conflicting but important401
demands, the more conservative it is.402
The following theorem presents a specific formula for calculating the initial risk403
degree:404
Theorem 1. An initial risk degree function of negotiating agent i can be given by:405
γiplp1qi pdqq “
$’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’%
ř
d˘i, jPD
˘
i
plipd˘i, j q´lp1qi pd˘i, j qqˇˇˇˇ
ˇřd˘i, jPD˘i lipd˘i, j q´|D˘i |
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
if
ř
d˘i, jPD˘i plipd
˘
i, jq ´ lp1qi pd˘i, jqq ą 0,
ř
d˘i, jPD
˘
i
plipd˘i, j q´lp1qi pd˘i, j qqˇˇˇˇ
ˇřd˘i, jPD˘i lipd˘i, j q´|D˘i |Hi
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
if
ř
d˘i, jPD˘i plipd
˘
i, jq ´ lp1qi pd˘i, jqq ă 0,
0 otherwise,
(9)
where D˘i is the conflicting demand set of negotiating agent i in Di.406
Proof. Let D˘i “ td˘i,1, . . . , d˘i,|D˘i |u.407
(i) If @d˘i, j P D˘i , lipd˘i, jq “ 1, then maxtγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u “ 0 and if408
@d˘i, j P D˘i , lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq “ 1, then γiplp1q
1
i pdqq “ 0. Therefore, @lp1qi , lp1q
1
i , γiplp1q
1
i pdqq ě409
γiplp1qi pdqq. Otherwise, maxtγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u “ 1, and thus if @d˘i, j P D˘i ,410
lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq “ 1, then411
γiplp1q1i pdqq “
plipd˘i,1q ´ 1q ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` plipd˘i,|D˘i |q ´ 1qˇˇˇˇř
d˘i, jPD˘i lipd
˘
i, jq ´
ˇˇˇ
D˘i
ˇˇˇˇˇˇˇ
“ 1.
Therefore, we still have @lp1qi , lp1q
1
i , γiplp1q
1
i pdqq ě γiplp1qi pdqq.412
(ii) If @d˘i, j P D˘i , lipd˘i, jq “ Hi, then mintγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u “ 0 and if413
@d˘i, j P D˘i , lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq “ Hi, then γiplp1q
1
i pdqq “ 0. Therefore, for any lp1qi , lp1q
1
i ,414
γiplp1q1i pdqq ď γiplp1qi pdqq. Otherwise, mintγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u “ ´1, and thus if415
13
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@d˘i, j P D˘i , lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq “ Hi, then416
γiplp1q1i pdqq “
plipd˘i,1q ´ Hiq ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` plipd˘i,|D˘i |q ´ Hiqˇˇˇˇř
d˘i, jPD˘i lipd
˘
i, jq ´
ˇˇˇ
D˘i
ˇˇˇ
Hi
ˇˇˇˇ
“ ´1.
Therefore, we still have @lp1qi , lp1q
1
i , γiplp1q
1
i pdqq ď γiplp1qi pdqq.417
(iii) By formula (9), if maxtγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u , 0 and mintγiplp1qi pdqq |418
lp1qi P Lp1qi u , 0, then maxtγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u “ 1 and mintγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P419
Lp1qi u “ ´1, thus maxtγipl
p1q
i pdqq|lp1qi PLp1qi u`mintγiplp1qi pdqq|lp1qi PLp1qi u
2 “ 0. And if @d˘i, j P D˘i ,420
lp1qi pd˘i, jq “ lipd˘i, jq, then γplp1qi pdqq “ 0. Therefore, we have421
γplp1qi pdqq “
maxtγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u `mintγiplp1qi pdqq | lp1qi P Lp1qi u
2
.
(iv) If Dd1˘i, j P D˘i such that lp1qi pd
1˘
i, j q ă lp1q
1
i pd
1˘
i, j q and @d˘i, j P D˘i such that d˘i, j ,422
d
1˘
i, j , l
p1q
i pd˘i, jq “ lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq, then423 ÿ
d˘i, jPD˘i
plipd˘i, jq ´ lp1qi pd˘i, jqq ą
ÿ
d˘i, jPD˘i
plipd˘i, jq ´ lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jqq.
Therefore, by formula (9), we have γiplp1qi pdqq ą γiplp1q
1
i pdqq.424
(v) If Dd1˘i, j P D˘i such that lp1qi pd˘
1
i, j q ą lp1q
1
i pd˘
1
i, j q and @d˘i, j P D˘i such that d˘i, j ,425
d
1˘
i, j , l
p1q
i pd˘i, jq “ lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jq, then426 ÿ
d˘i, jPD˘i
plipd˘i, jq ´ lp1qi pd˘i, jqq ă
ÿ
d˘i, jPD˘i
plipd˘i, jq ´ lp1q
1
i pd˘i, jqq.
Therefore, by formula (9), we have γiplp1qi pdqq ă γiplp1q
1
i pdqq. 427
3.2. Fuzzy linguistic terms of fuzzy variables428
The meanings of these parameters’ linguistic terms are as follows. The low regret429
degree (RD) indicates that a negotiating agent only regrets a little for the demands430
given up in the previous round. The medium regret degree means that a negotiating431
agent regrets giving up the demands in the previous round. And the high regret degree432
means that a negotiating agent regrets very much giving up the demands in the previous433
round, and so most likely changes the preference ordering because it causes many434
consistent demands lost. Similarly, we can understand the linguistic terms of the other435
two parameters: patience descent degree (PDD) and initial risk degree (IRD).436
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Figure 2: The membership functions of various linguistic terms of Regret Degree
These linguistic terms can be modelled by the fuzzy membership function as fol-437
lows:438
µpxq “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
0 if x ď a,
x´a
b´a if a ď x ď b,
1 if b ď x ď c,
d´x
d´c if c ď x ď d,
0 if x ě d.
(10)
The reason for our choice of formula (10) is as follows. Its parameters a, b, c and d439
can reflect well that different people could set the membership function of the same440
linguistic term differently. For example, when a “ b “ c ă d, it reflects a decreasing441
tendency; when a ă b “ c “ d, it reflects an increasing tendency; when a ă b “ c ă442
d, it reflects a tendency that is increasing between a and b, decreasing between c and443
d; and when a ă b ă c ă d, it reflects a tendency that is increasing between a and b,444
reaching the maximum level between b and c, and decreasing between c and d [45].445
For convenience, we denote formula (10) as µpxq=(a, b, c, d). Thus, the linguistic446
terms of regret degree (RD) can be represented as:447
µlow RDpϑq “ p´0.2, 0, 0.2, 0.4q, (11)
µmedium RDpϑq “ p0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8q, (12)
µhigh RDpϑq “ p0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2q. (13)
Similarly, we can have:448
µlow PDDpρq “ p´0.2, 0, 0.2, 0.4q, (14)
µmedium PDDpρq “ p0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8q, (15)
µhigh PDDpρq “ p0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2q; (16)
µlow IRDpγq “ p´1.4,´1,´0.6,´0.2q, (17)
µmedium IRDpγq “ p´0.6,´0.2, 0.2, 0.6q, (18)
µhigh IRDpγq “ p0.2, 0.6, 1, 1.4q; (19)
15
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Table 2: Fuzzy rules
1 If regret degree is Low then preference change degree is Low.
2 If regret degree is Medium then preference change degree is Medium.
3 If regret degree is High then preference change degree is High.
4 If patience descent degree is Low then preference change degree is Low.
5 If patience descent degree is Medium then preference change degree is Medium.
6 If patience descent degree is High then preference change degree is High.
7 If initial risk degree is Low then preference change degree is High.
8 If initial risk degree is Medium then preference change degree is Medium.
9 If initial risk degree is High then preference change degree is Low.
449
µlow CDpζq “ p´0.2, 0, 0.2, 0.4q, (20)
µmedium CDpζq “ p0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8q, (21)
µhigh CDpζq “ p0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2q. (22)
We draw the membership functions of the three linguistic terms of regret degree in450
Figure 2 and the figures of the membership functions of other inputs and outputs are451
similar. The setting of the parameters (i.e., a, b, c and d) of each linguistic terms is452
based on our experimental results, which will be discussed in Section 3.3.453
3.3. Psychological experiment454
We calculate a preference change degree from a negotiating agent’s regret degree,455
patience descent degree, and initial risk degree by the fuzzy rules as shown in Table456
2. There Rule 1 means that if a negotiating agent does not lose too many consistent457
demands, which makes him regret just a little, then his desire to change his preference458
ordering is low. Similarly, we can understand other rules. The relations between the459
rules’ inputs and output are shown in the left column of Figure 3. We can see that460
overall the preference change degree increases with the increase of the regret degree461
and the patience descent degree in an upward trend, while decreases with the increase462
of the initial risk degree in a downward trend.463
These fuzzy rules were established by a psychological survey with 40 human sub-464
jects. Empirically, 30 is the minimal sample size required to conduct such a statistical465
analysis, while more than 50 is pointless [64, 45]. Therefore, it was reasonable to466
choose 40 (18 females and 22 males). They ranged in age from 19 to 40, and varied in467
careers and educational levels. All the subjects volunteered to participate and complete468
the questionnaires, which consisted of the following four parts:469
3.3.1. Risk Orientation Questionnaire470
This uses 12 items to assess individuals’ risk propensity and cautiousness [42]. That471
is, to ask a subject to choose an appropriate number, in-between 1 and 7, to indicate472
how much he/she agrees with the following statements (1 means totally disagree, then473
the numbers from 2 to 6 indicate the agreement degrees that become gradually stronger,474
and 7 means totally agree):475
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Figure 3: The relations between the prefer nce change degree and the three parameters in our fuzzy logic
system (the first column) and in psychological experiments (the second column)
1) I am very careful when making and implementing a plan.476
2) My motto is “Nothing ventured, nothing gained”.477
3) I do not like to make a risky decision.478
4) As long as a task is very interesting, regardless of whether or not I am able to479
conduct it well, I will try it.480
5) I do not like to take a risk at the cost of what I have, I would rather stay safe in481
everything.482
6) Even though I knew it had not been a good choice, I still decided to gamble.483
7) I often set myself smaller goals at work, so I can more easily achieve them.484
8) Even though most people disagree with me, I will still air my own ideas.485
9) I always make decisions after careful thinking.486
10) I sometimes like to do things for others to show my ability even though there487
will be the risk of error.488
11) I often imagine the negative consequences of my actions.489
12) I would rather take a great risk in order to succeed.490
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3.3.2. Regret Scale491
This consists of 5 items designed to assess how subjects deal with decision situa-492
tions after the decision has been made, specifically the extent to which they experience493
regret [65]. That is, to choose a number, in-between 1 and 7 (1 means totally dis-494
agree, then the numbers from 2 to 6 indicate the gradually stronger agreement degree,495
and 7 means totally agree), to indicate how much a subject agrees with the following496
statements:497
1) Once I have made a decision, I will not regret it.498
2) After making a decision, I would like to know what would have happened if I499
had chosen another.500
3) When I find that other options could bring better results, I feel very frustrated501
although the outcomes brought by the current selection are also good.502
4) I will always think of the opportunities missed when I am thinking how well I503
live now.504
5) I always gather information about other options when I have to make a decision.505
3.3.3. Delay-discounting rate506
This assesses a subject’s patience level by offering a human subject a series of507
choices between immediate but less rewards and larger but delayed rewards as follows508
[66]:509
1) $30 now vs. $85 14 days later; 2) $40 now vs. $55 25 days later;510
3) $67 now vs. $85 35 days later; 4) $34 now vs. $35 43 days later;511
5) $15 now vs. $35 10 days later; 6) $32 now vs. $55 20 days later;512
7) $83 now vs. $85 35 days later; 8) $21 now vs. $30 75 days later;513
9) $48 now vs. $55 45 days later; 10) $40 now vs. $65 70 days later;514
11) $25 now vs. $35 25 days later; 12) $65 now vs. $75 50 days later;515
13) $24 now vs. $55 10 days later; 14) $30 now vs. $35 20 days later;516
15) $53 now vs. $55 50 days later; 16) $47 now vs. $60 50 days later;517
17) $40 now vs. $70 20 days later; 18) $50 now vs. $80 70 days later;518
19) $45 now vs. $70 35 days later; 20) $27 now vs. $30 35 days later;519
21) $16 now vs. $30 35 days later.520
3.3.4. Maximisation Scale Short521
This uses 6 items to assess individuals’ tendency to optimise decisions, and that522
people with a tendency to optimise their decision are less likely change their original523
decisions [67]. That is, ask a subject to choose an appropriate number, in-between 1524
and 7 (1 means totally disagree, then the numbers from 2 to 6 indicate the agreement525
degrees that is gradually stronger, and 7 means totally agree), to indicate how much526
he/she agrees with the following statements:527
1) No matter how much I am satisfied with my current job, I am always looking for528
a better opportunity.529
2) No matter what I do, I will finish it up to the highest standard.530
3) When I am watching TV, even though I am now quite satisfied with the current531
programme, I will still search for other channels to see whether or not there is a532
better one.533
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Table 3: Regression analysis results. Here β is the standardised regression coefficient; S .E. is the standard
error of the estimate; and p is the significant level of the t-test.
β S.E. t value p
Intercept -12.38 6.59 -1.88 0.07
Regret degree 0.36 0.17 2.12 0.04
Impatience 1.18 2.16 0.55 0.59
Risk degree -0.17 0.10 1.66 0.10
4) Shopping is very difficult for me because I always try to find the most appropriate534
things for me.535
5) I am never satisfied with the second best choice.536
6) I always think it is very difficult for me to help a friend to choose a gift in a shop.537
A multi-regression analysis [68] is conducted to test the effect of the risk attitude,538
the regret degree and the patience level on how individuals approach their decision. The539
analysis results are reported in Table 3. The regret degree is significantly relevant to the540
tendency to change their decisions (i.e., β =0.36 and p=0.04). Those, who experience541
more regret after the decision has been made, are more likely to change their decisions.542
Risk attitude is marginally related to the preference change degree (i.e., β =-0.17 and543
p=0.10). Those, who prefer a higher level of risk, tend to insist on their original de-544
cisions. The patience level is also positively relevant to the preference change degree545
(i.e., β =1.18 and p=0.59).546
As shown in the right column of Figure 3, according to the experiment results, we547
draw three scatter plots for ζ’s change with the regret degree, the patience descent level,548
and the risk attitude, respectively. The curve was superimposed on each scatter plot549
using the scatter smoother function lowesspq of the MASS package in the R system for550
statistical analysis. Compared with the left column of Figure 3, we can see our fuzzy551
rules well reflect the result of these psychological experiments.552
3.4. Fuzzy inference method553
We employ standard fuzzy inference method [69, 70].554
The following definition is about the fuzzy logic implication of the well-known555
Mamdani method [70].556
Definition 10. Let Ai be a Boolean combination of fuzzy sets Ai,1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Ai,m, where Ai, j557
is a fuzzy set defined on Ui, j pi “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , n; j “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,mq, and Bi be fuzzy set on U 1558
pi “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , nq. Then when the inputs are µAi,1pui,1q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , µAi,mpui,mq, the output of fuzzy559
rule i Ñ Bi is fuzzy set B1i defined as follows:560
@u1 PU 1, µipu1q“mintf pµAi,1pui,1q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , µAi,mpui,mqq, µBipu1qu, (23)
where f is obtained through replacing Ai, j in Ai by µAi, jpui, jq and replacing “and”,561
“or”, and “not” in Ai by “min”, “max”, and “1´ µ”, respectively. And the output of562
all rules A1 Ñ B1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , An Ñ Bn, is fuzzy set M, which is given by:563
@u1 P U 1, µMpu1q “ maxtµ1pu1q, ¨ ¨ ¨ , µnpu1qu. (24)
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564
Thus, by formulas (23) and (24), the output of all these rules in Table 2 is fuzzy set565
M defined as: @u1 P U 1,566
µMpζq “ maxtmintµlow RDpϑq, µlow CDpζqu,
mintµmedium RDpϑq, µmedium CDpζqu,
mintµhigh RDpϑq, µhigh CDpζqu,
mintµlow PDDpρq, µlow CDpζqu,
mintµmedium PDDpρq, µmedium CDpζqu,
mintµhigh PDDpρq, µhigh CDpζqu,
mintµlow IRDpγq, µhigh CDpζqu,
mintµmedium IRDpγq, µmedium CDpζqu,
mintµhigh IRDpγq, µlow CDpζquu. (25)
By Definition 10, the result that we get is still a fuzzy set. To defuzzify the fuzzy567
set, we need the following centroid method [71]:568
Definition 11. The centroid point ucen of fuzzy set M given by formula (24) is:569
ucen “
ş
U1 u
1µMpu1q du1ş
U1 µMpu1q du1
, (26)
or570
ucen “
nř
j“1
u jµMpu jq
nř
j“1
µMpu jq
. (27)
Actually, ucen above is the centroid of the area that is circled by the curve of mem-571
bership function µM and the horizontal ordinate.3572
4. Properties573
This section will reveal some properties of our model.574
4.1. The influence of regret, patience and risk575
In this subsection, we will discuss how a negotiating agent’s psychological factors576
of regret, patience and risk influence the preference change degrees according to the577
fuzzy rules.578
3Some people may challenge the robustness of these fuzzy inference methods, but the problem is out of
the scope of this paper. We just apply the well-known fuzzy logic methods into automated negotiation. Of
course, in the future we can study what will be resulted if using different fuzzy inference methods for our
negotiation problem.
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Table 4: Original and dynamic preference hierarchies of Parties 1 and 2
Level Party 1 Party 2original dynamic original dynamic
1 EHI CJO  LR, CJO  LR, CJO, RT
2 CJO, LPAV, MR EHI,  LR  FHC,  RT  FHC,  EHI
3  RMB,  LR LPAV, IEI  EHI, RMB RMB,  LRAV, IEI
4 IEI, BHR,  FHC MR, BHR,  FHC  LRAV, IEI  MR
5 RT  RMB, RT BHR,  MR BHR
Theorem 2. Suppose after a negotiation round, a negotiating agent has regret degree579
ϑ, patience descent degree ρ, and initial risk degree γ, and thus gets the corresponding580
preference change degree of ζ through our FLS. Then:581
(i) If ϑ ě 0.8 then @ρ P r0, 1s, γ P r´1, 1s, ζ ě 0.5; and if ϑ ď 0.2 then @ρ P582
r0, 1s, γ P r´1, 1s, ζ ď 0.5.583
(ii) If ρ ě 0.8 then @r1 P r0, 1s, γ P r´1, 1s, ζ ě 0.5; and if ρ ď 0.2 then @ϑ P584
r0, 1s, γ P r´1, 1s, ζ ď 0.5.585
(iii) If γ ě 0.6 then @ϑ P r0, 1s, ρ P r0, 1s, ζ ď 0.5; and if γ ď ´0.6 then @ϑ P586
r0, 1s, ρ P r0, 1s, ζ ě 0.5.587
Proof. Firstly we prove property (i). When ϑ P r0.8, 1s, by the definitions of µlow RD588
(i.e., formula (11)), µmedium RD (i.e., formula (12)), and µhigh RD (i.e., formula (13)), we can589
get µlow RDpϑq “ µmedium RDpϑq “ 0 and µhigh RDpϑq “ 1. By formula (23), the outputs590
of the first three rules in Table 2 are µ1pζq “ 0, µ2pζq “ 0, and µ3pζq “ µhigh CDpζq,591
respectively. Now we want to find out the minimum of µcen. Because of ρ P r0, 1s and592
γ P r´1, 1s, when the assignment of ρ or γ changes, the shape of µMpζq may change.593
More specifically, by formulas (24) and (26) we have the following cases:594
1) In the case of ρ P r0, 0.2s and γ P r0.6, 1s, we have:595
µMpζq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.4,
0 if 0.4 ď ζ ď 0.6,
5ζ ´ 3 if 0.6 ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if 0.8 ď ζ ď 1;
ucen “ 0.5.
2) In the case of ρ P r0, 0.2s and γ P r0.4, 0.6s, we have:596
µMpζq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.1` 0.5γ,
1.5´2.5γ if 0.1`0.5γďζď0.9´0.5γ,
5ζ ´ 3 if 0.9´ 0.5γ ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if 0.8 ď ζ ď 1;
ucen “ 0.5.
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3) In the case of ρ P r0, 0.2s and γ P r0.2, 0.4s, we have:597
µMpζq “
$’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.3,
5ζ ´ 1 if 0.3 ď ζ ď 0.5´ 0.5γ,
1.5´2.5γ if 0.5´0.5γďζď0.5`0.5γ,
4´ 5ζ if 0.5` 0.5γ ď ζ ď 0.7,
5ζ ´ 3 if 0.7 ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if 0.8 ď ζ ď 1;
ucen “ 0.5.
4) In the case of ρ P r0, 0.2s and γ P r´0.2, 0.2s, we have:598
µMpζq “
$’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.3,
5ζ ´ 1 if 0.3 ď ζ ď 0.4,
1 if 0.4 ď ζ ď 0.6,
4´ 5ζ if 0.6 ď ζ ď 0.7,
5ζ ´ 3 if 0.7 ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if 0.8 ď ζ ď 1;
ucen “ 0.5.
5) In the case of ρ P r0, 0.2s and γ P r´0.4,´0.2s, we have:599
µMpζq “
$’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.3,
5ζ ´ 1 if 0.3 ď ζ ď 0.5` 0.5γ,
1.5`2.5γ if 0.5`0.5γďζď0.5´0.5γ,
4´ 5ζ if 0.5´ 0.5γ ď ζ ď 0.7,
5ζ ´ 3 if 0.7 ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if 0.8 ď ζ ď 1;
ucen “ 0.5.
6) In the case of ρ P r0, 0.2s and γ P r´0.6,´0.4s, we have:600
µMpζq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.1´ 0.5γ,
1.5`2.5γ if 0.1´0.5γďζď0.9`0.5γ,
5ζ ´ 3 if 0.9` 0.5γ ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if 0.8 ď ζ ď 1;
ucen “ 0.5.
7) In the case of ρ P r0, 0.2s and γ P r´1,´0.6s, we have:601
µMpζq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.4,
0 if 0.4 ď ζ ď 0.6,
5´ 3ζ if 0.6 ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if 0.8 ď ζ ď 1;
ucen “ 0.5.
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Similarly, we can discuss the other cases where ρ is in r0.2, 0.3s, r0.3, 0.4s, r0.4,602
0.6s, r0.6, 0.7s, r0.7, 0.8s, and r0.8, 1s, respectively. Finally we can find that when603
ρ P r0, 0.2s or γ P r0.6, 1s, µcen “ 0.5, which is the maximum. Therefore, if ϑ ě 0.8604
then @ρ P r0, 1s, γ P r´1, 1s, ζ ě 0.5.605
If ϑ P r0, 0.2s, by the definitions of µlow RD (i.e., formula (11)), µmedium RD (i.e., formula606
(12)), and µhigh RD (i.e., formula (13)), we can get µmedium RDpϑq “ µhigh RDpϑq “ 0 and607
µlow RDpϑq “ 1. By formula (23), the outputs of the first three rules in Table 2 are608
µ1pζq “ µlow CDpζq, µ2pζq “ 0, and µ3pζq “ 0, respectively. By formulas (24) and (26)609
as well as the other 6 rules in Table 2, similar to the above discussion, we know that610
when ρ P r0.8, 1s or γ P r´1,´0.6s, µcen “ 0.5, which is the maximum. We choose611
an appropriate case where ρ “ 1 and γ “ ´1 to calculate the maximum value. In this612
case, we have:613
µMpζq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.4,
0 if 0.4 ď ζ ď 0.6,
5ζ ´ 3 if 0.6 ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if ζ ě 0.8.
And by formula (26), we have:614
ucen “
ş1
0 ζµMpζq dζş1
0 µMpζq dζ
“ 0.5.
Therefore, if ϑ ď 0.2 then @ρ P r0, 1s, γ P r´1, 1s, ζ ď 0.5.615
Similarly, we can prove properties (ii) and (iii) of this theorem. 616
This theorem reveals that when a parameter is higher or lower than a certain thresh-617
old, the preference change degree can be controlled within a certain range (higher or618
lower than a mid-value, i.e., 0.5 in our fuzzy system). This is in accord with our intu-619
itions, i.e., when a negotiating agent regrets his preference changing extremely, even620
though he is patient and risk-seeking, likely he is very unwilling to insist on his original621
preference.622
4.2. Agreement Existence623
We now discuss the agreement existence of our negotiation procedures. In the624
discussion of this subsection, we use formulas (5), (6), and (9) as the regret degree,625
patience descent degree and initial risk degree functions, respectively.626
Firstly, the following theorem states that no matter how different the attitudes of627
risk, regret and patience that the negotiating agents possess, if they have at least two628
demands in common, they can reach an agreement.629
Theorem 3. In a bilateral negotiation procedure G, if @i P Ni, D di,1, di,2 < D˘i such630
that lp1qpdi,1q , lp1qpdi,2q, then ADSCSpGq ,H.631
Proof. Firstly, similar to the discussion in the proof of Theorem 2, we can prove that632
when ϑ “ 0.3, ρ P r0, 0.2s and γ P r0.6, 1s, the value of µcen is the minimum. We633
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choose an appropriate situation where ϑ “ 0.3, ρ “ 0 and γ “ 1 to calculate the634
minimum value. In this situation, by formulas (24) and (26), we have:635
µMpζq “
$’’’’&’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5ζ if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.3,
0.5 if 0.3 ď ζ ď 0.7,
4´ 5ζ if 0.7 ď ζ ď 0.8,
1 if ζ ě 0.8;
ucen “
ş1
0 ζµMpζq dζş1
0 µMpζq dζ
“ 0.31 ą 0.3.
Therefore, if regret degree ϑ ě 0.3, no matter what the patience descent degree and the636
initial risk degree are, the corresponding preference change degree is not less than 0.3.637
Secondly, we prove the theorem by using the above conclusion. Suppose the ne-638
gotiation procedure reaches no agreements. Then by Definition 6, there does not exist639
a λ such that @i P N,Dpλqi , H, λ ă |D|min, where |D|min is the minimum of demand640
amount among all negotiating agents’ demand sets. That is, before the end of the ne-641
gotiation process, there is at least one negotiating agent who has at least one demand642
inconsistent with each other. However, this situation is impossible in our assumption643
because when the negotiation procedure continues to the above situation, at least one644
negotiating agent has to give up all his consistent demands. Nevertheless, let us con-645
sider the situation where a negotiating agent has given up m´1 consistent demands (m646
is the total number of his consistent demands). By the formula of calculating regret de-647
gree (i.e., formula (5)), we know regret degree ϑ of the negotiating agent in this round648
is m´1m . Since649
mintm´ 1
m
| m P Nu “ 1
2
ě 0.3,
we have ϑ ě 0.3. Hence, we know the corresponding preference change degree ζ ě650
0.3. Therefore, by action function (1), @i P Ni, if Dd˘i P D˘i such that lpdqpd˘i q ď651
Hip1q ´ 1, demand d˘i will be downgraded and the left consistent demand will be652
not given up by our negotiation protocol after preference updating. Therefore, it is653
impossible that at the end of the negotiation process there is at least a negotiator who654
has at least a demand inconsistent with others’. Hence, ADSCSpGq ,H. 655
It seems that if there is at least one non-conflicting demand in the demand sets656
of all agents, there will be an agreement. However, in our negotiation model, two657
non-conflicting demands are needed to achieve an agreement because in our model,658
different agents may have difference preferences on demands and rank them in different659
hierarchies, but which is private information, so that the non-conflicting demand may660
be given up by all the agents in the earlier stage of a negotiation in our model.661
The following theorem states that no matter how different personalities the negoti-662
ating agents own, if they have at least one demand in common and one of them is not663
at their low levels of preference hierarchies, but in the middle or high levels, then an664
agreement can be reached finally.665
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Theorem 4. In a bilateral negotiation procedure G, if @i P Ni, Ddi < D˘i such that666
|td j | d j P Di, lp1qpd jq ą lp1qpdiqu| ą r |D|i3 s,
then ADSCSpGq ,H.667
Proof. Similar to that of Theorem 3, we can prove that if ρ ě 0.3 then @r1 P r0, 1s, γ P668
r´1, 1s, ζ ě 0.3. Suppose the negotiation procedure reaches no agreements. Then by669
Definition 6, there does not exist a λ such that @i P N,Dpλqi , H, λ ă |D|min, where670 |D|min is the minimum of demand amount among all negotiating agents’ demand sets.671
That is, before the end of the negotiation process, there is at least one negotiating agent672
who has at least one demand inconsistent with each other. However, this situation673
is impossible in our assumption because when the negotiation procedure continues to674
round r |D|i3 s, ρipr |D|i3 sq “ r
|D|i
3 s
|D|i ě 0.3. Thus, by the above inference the corresponding675
preference change degree ζ will be not less than 0.3. Therefore, by action function (1),676
@i P Ni, if Dd˘i P D˘i such that lpdqpd˘i q ď Hip1q ´ 1, demand d˘i will be downgraded677
and the left consistent demands will not be given up by our negotiation model after678
preference updating. Therefore, it is impossible that in the last round of the negotiation679
procedure there is at least a negotiating agent who has at least one demand inconsistent680
with others’, i.e., @i P N, Ddi P Dpλqi , D j , i, di ^ Dpλqj $ K. Hence, ADSCSpGq ,H. 681
5. Example682
In this section, we will illustrate our negotiation model through a political exam-683
ple. Suppose two political parties are negotiating over some policies that will be writ-684
ten into new planning. Party 1 supports economical housing investment (EHI), raising685
taxes (RT), medical reform (MR), building high-speed railways (BHR), creating job686
opportunities (CJO), increasing education investment (IEI), and lengthening paid an-687
nual vacation (LPAV); but opposes rescuing major bank (RMB), fighting with hostile688
country (FHC), and land reclamation (LR). Party 2 supports RMB, BHR, CJO and IEI;689
but opposes EHI, RT, LPAV, MR, FHC and LR. That is, their demand sets are:690
D1 “ tEHI, RT, BHR, CJO, IEI, LPAV, MR, RMB, FHC, LRu,
D2 “ tRMB, BHR, CJO, IEI, EHI, RT, LPAV, FHC, LR, MRu.
As shown in Table 4, two parties have their original preferences over their own poli-691
cies, which just reflect their own voters’ favourites rather than the other side’s situation.692
Nonetheless, when going to the negotiation, they will worry about their conflicting de-693
mands and thus adjust the preferences to form initial dynamic ones, hoping to avoid694
reaching no agreements, whilst keeping as many of their highly preferred demands as695
possible. In this example, Party 1 demands RT but Party 2 demands  RT, which is696
a contradiction. Therefore, RT is an element of party 1’s conflicting demand set and697
 RT is an element of party 2’s one. Similarly, we can get698
D˘1 “ tEHI, LPAV, MR, RMB,RTu,
D˘2 “ t EHI, LPAV, MR,RMB, RTu.
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From Table 4, by formula (9), Party 1’s initial risk degree is:699
γ1
“pl1pEHIq´ l
p1q
1 pEHIqq` pl1pLPAV q´ lp1q1 pLPAVqq` pl1pMRq´ lp1q1 pMRqq` pl1p RMBq´ lp1q1 p RMBqq`pl1pRT q´ lp1q1 pRTq
|pl1pEHIq´5q` pl1pLPAVq´5q` pl2p MRq´ 5q` pl1p RMBq´ 5q` pl1pRTq´5q|
“ p1´ 2q ` p2´ 3q ` p2´ 4q ` p3´ 5q ` p5´ 5qˇˇp1´ 5q ` p2´ 5q ` p2´ 5q ` p3´ 5q ` p5´ 5qˇˇ
“´0.5.
Similarly, by formula (9), we can obtain:700
γ2
“ pl2p RTq´ l
p1q
2 p RTqq` pl2p EHIq´ lp1q2 p EHIqq` pl2pRMBq´ lp1q2 pRMBqq` pl2p PLAVq´ lp1q2 p PLAVqq` pl2p MRq´ lp1q2 p MRqq
|pl2p RT q´ 1q` pl2p EHIq´ 1q` pl2pRMBq´ 1q`pl2p LPAVq´1q` pl2p MRq´ 1q|
“ p2´ 1q ` p3´ 2q ` p3´ 3q ` p4´ 3q ` p5´ 4qˇˇp2´ 1q ` p3´ 1q ` p3´ 1q ` p4´ 1q ` p5´ 1qˇˇ
“0.33.
Party 1 downgrades the conflicting demand of EHI from the top level to the second701
level, downgrades LPAV from the second level to the third level, and downgrades the702
other conflicting demands MR and RMB. Therefore, Party 1 is somewhat risk-averse.703
On the other hand, Party 2 is risk-seeking, because it moves up its conflicting demands704
 RT,  EHI,  LPAV and  MR when changing the original preference to the initial705
dynamic one.706
Suppose Party 2 is more patient than Party 1. Then Party 1 uses formula (7) and707
Party 2 uses formula (8) as their patience descent degree functions, respectively. Now708
we show how the problem is solved by using our dynamically simultaneous concession709
process. During the negotiation, the changes of preference and parameters are shown710
in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.711
More specifically, there are two steps in the first round of negotiation. Firstly, as712
shown in Table 4, there are some contradiction in demands of Parties 1 and 2, so each713
of them chooses one demand (conflicting demands have priority) on the lowest level in714
their dynamic preferences and gives up a demand, i.e., Party 1 gives up RT and Party 2715
gives up BHR. After the first step of the first round, the dynamic preference structure716
will be updated into a new one, by simultaneous concession, as shown in the first row717
(denoted as Round 1) in the left sub-table of Table 5. Secondly, by the parameters’718
functions (i.e., formulas (5) and (7)-(9)), we can obtain:719
ϑ1 “ 05 “ 0, ρ1 “
a
1ˆ p2ˆ 10´ 1q
10
“ 0.436;
γ1 “ ´0.5, ϑ2 “ 15 “ 0.2,
ρ2 “ 1´
?
102 ´ 12
10
“ 0.005, γ2 “ 0.33.
Thus, according to fuzzy rules in Table 2, based on the Mamdani method (see Defini-720
tion 10), we can obtain:721
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Table 5: Dynamic negotiation proceeding
Rank Party 1 Party 2
1 CJO  LR, CJO, RT
2  LR, EHI  FHC, EHI
3 LPAV, IEI RMB, IEI, LPAV
R
ou
nd
1
4  FHC, MR, BHR  MR
5  RMB
1 CJO  LR, CJO
2  LR  FHC, RT
3 IEI, EHI IEI, EHI
R
ou
nd
2
4  FHC, BHR, LPAV RMB, LPAV
5 MR
1 CJO  LR, CJO
2  LR  FHC
3 IEI IEI, RT
R
ou
nd
3
4  FHC, BHR, EHI  EHI
5 LPAV RMB
1 CJO  LR, CJO
2  LR  FHC
3 IEI IEI
R
ou
nd
4
4  FHC, BHR  RT
5 EHI RMB
Rank Party 1 Party 2
1 CJO  LR, CJO
2  LR  FHC, RT
3 IEI, EHI IEI, EHI
R
ou
nd
1˚
4  FHC, BHR, LPAV RMB, LPAV
5 MR, RMB  MR
1 CJO  LR, CJO
2  LR  FHC
3 IEI IEI, RT
R
ou
nd
2˚
4  FHC, BHR, EHI  EHI
5 MR, LPAV RMB, LPAV
1 CJO  LR, CJO
2  LR  FHC
3 IEI IEI
R
ou
nd
3˚
4  FHC, BHR  RT
5 EHI, LPAV  EHI, RMB
1 CJO  LR, CJO
2  LR  FHC
3 IEI IEI
R
ou
nd
4˚
4  FHC, BHR
5 EHI  RT, RMB
Table 6: Parameters
parameters Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
pϑ1, ϑ2q (0, 0.2) (0, 0.2) (0, 0.2) (0, 0.2)
pρ1, ρ2q (0.436, 0.005) (0.600, 0.020) (0.714, 0.046) (0.800, 0.200)
pγ1, γ2q (-0.5, 0.33) (-0.5, 0.33) (-0.5, 0.33) (-0.5, 0.33)
pζ1, ζ2q (0.474, 0.331) (0.474, 0.331) (0.5, 0.331) (0.5, 0.331)
µM,1pζq “ maxtmintµlow RDp0q, µlow CDpζqu,mintµmedium RDp0q, µmedium CDpζqu,
mintµhigh RDp0q, µhigh CDpζqu,mintµlow PDDp0.436q, µlow CDpζqu,
mintµmedium PDDp0.436q, µmedium CDpζqu,mintµhigh PDDp0.436q, µhigh CDpζqu,
mintµlow IRDp´0.5q, µhigh CDpζqu,mintµmedium IRDp´0.5q, µmedium CDpζqu,
mintµhigh IRDp´0.5q, µlow CDpζquu
“
$’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’%
1 if 0 ď ζ ď 0.2,
2´ 5x if 0.2 ď ζ ď 0.3,
5x´ 1 if 0.3 ď ζ ď 0.4,
1 if 0.4 ď ζ ď 0.6,
4´ 5x if 0.6 ď ζ ď 0.7,
5x´ 3 if 0.7 ď ζ ď 0.75,
0.75 if 0.75 ď ζ ě 1.
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Then, by formula (26) we have:722
ζ1 “ ucen,1 “
ş1
0 ζµMpζq dζş1
0 µMpζq dζ
“ 0.474.
Similarly, we can obtain ζ2 “ 0.331 in this round. Thus, according to their action723
function (i.e., formula (1)), their initial dynamic preferences are updated into new ones724
as shown in the first row (denoted as Round 1˚) in the right sub-table of Table 5. Since725
Party 1’s preference change degree is higher than 0.3 but lower than 0.7, according726
to the second branch of action function (1) it chooses “move down the conflicting727
demand one level” in the first round for EHI,  LPAV, MR, and  RMB, and according728
to the third branch of action function (1) leaves the others unchanged. And Party 2’s729
preference change degree is also higher than 0.3 but lower than 0.7, so according to the730
second branch of action function (1), it chooses “move down the conflicting demand731
one level” for RT, EHI, RMB, LPAV, and MR, and according to the third branch732
of action function (1), it leaves the others unchanged.733
Similarly, in the first step of the second round, Party 1 gives up  RMB and Party734
2 gives up  MR. After the first step, their preferences are shown in Round 2. In this735
round, by formulas (5) and (7)-(9), we can obtain ϑ1 “ 0, ρ1 “ 0.6, γ1 “ ´0.5,736
ϑ2 “ 0.2, ρ2 “ 0.02, and γ2 “ 0.33, respectively. Then ζ1 “ 0.474 and ζ2 “ 0.331.737
Thus, according to the second branch of action function (1) both parties choose “move738
down the conflicting demand one level” for EHI and LPAV (Party 1) and  RT,  EHI,739
RMB, and  LPAV (Party 2). According to the third branch of action function (1), they740
leave the others unchanged.741
In the first step of the third round, Party 1 gives up MR and Party 2 gives up LPAV.742
After the first step, their preferences are shown in Round 3. In this round, by formulas743
(5) and (7)-(9), we can obtain ϑ1 “ 0, ρ1 “ 0.714, γ1 “ ´0.5, ϑ2 “ 0.2, ρ2 “ 0.046,744
and γ2 “ 0.33, respectively. Then ζ1 “ 0.5 and ζ2 “ 0.331. According to action745
function (1), EHI of Party 1 and  RMB,  RT, and  EHI of Party 2 decline one level746
in this round.747
In the first step of the fourth round, Party 1 gives up LPAV and Party 2 gives up748
 EHI. After the first step, their preferences are shown in Round 4. In this round, by749
formulas (5) and (7)-(9), we can obtain ϑ1 “ 0, ρ1 “ 0.8, γ1 “ ´0.5, ϑ2 “ 0.2, ρ2 “750
0.2, and γ2 “ 0.33, respectively. Then ζ1 “ 0.5 and ζ2 “ 0.331. Thus according to751
the third branch of action function (1), Party 1 chooses “do nothing” for all conflicting752
demands in this round and according to the second branch of action function (1), party753
2 moves down  RT one level and according to the third branch of action function (1)754
it leaves the others unchanged.755
The negotiation procedure ends after the 4th round because both of the parties have756
nothing in contradiction.757
From Table 5, we can see that by our dynamically simultaneous concession method,758
the outcome of the negotiation procedure is:759
ADSCS,1pGq “ tCJO, LR, IEI, FHC,BHR,EHIu,
ADSCS,2pGq “ t LR,CJO, FHC, IEI, RT, RMBu.
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Therefore, their agreement is:760
ADSCSpGq “ ADSCS,1pGq Y ADSCS,2pGq
“ tCJO, LR, IEI, FHC,BHR,EHI, RT,RMBu.
6. Experimental analyses761
In order to reveal some insights into our model, we do lots of simulation experi-762
mental analysis in this section, which can be divided into two parts. In Section 6.1,763
we do experiments to explain why we just consider the downgrading direction in ac-764
tion function (1) in our model. In Section 6.2, we do experiments to analyse how the765
negotiating agents’ attitudes of risk affect the outcome of a negotiation procedure.766
6.1. Comparison with other action functions767
This subsection presents the experiment of justifying why we choose formula (1),768
rather than the following ones, as the action function of a negotiating agent:769
A1i pζq “
$’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’%
move d˘ down two levels from its current level in round λ
if ζ ě 0.8^ lpλqi pd˘q ď Hip1q ´ 2,
move d˘ down one level from its current level in round λ
if (0.8ąζě0.6^lpλqi pd˘qďHip1q ´ 1q _ pζě0.8^lpλqi pd q˘“Hip1q´1q,
move d˘ up two levels from its current level in round λ
if ζ ă 0.2^ lpλqi pd˘q ě 3,
move d˘ up one level from its current level in round λ
if (0.2 ď ζ ă 0.4^ lpλqi pd˘q ě 2q _ pζ ă 0.2^ lpλqi pd˘q “ 2q
do nothing
otherwise;
(28)
A2i pζq “
$’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’%
move d˘ up two levels from its current level in round λ
if ζ ă 0.3^ lpλqi pd˘q ě 3,
move d˘ up one level from its current level in round λ
if (0.3 ď ζ ă 0.7^ lpλqi pd˘q ě 2q _ pζ ă 0.3^ lpλqi pd˘q “ 2q,
do nothing
otherwise,
(29)
where D˘i is the conflicting demand set of negotiating agent i in Di, d
˘ P D˘i , and770
λ means the λ-th round of the negotiation procedure. The difference among the action771
functions (1), (28) and (29) is that action function (1) just considers the downgrad-772
ing direction of updating preference, action function (29) just considers the upgrading773
direction, and action function (28) considers both directions.774
On the Matlab platform, we conduct two experiments to see how different action775
functions influence the outcomes when the number of conflicting demands and negoti-776
ating agents change, respectively. In both experiments, we run the negotiation model777
1,000 times under the setting that every negotiating agent’s action function is the same778
(action function (1) or action function (28) or action function (29)), and the fuzzy rules779
are those in Table 2.780
In the first experiment, we randomly generate 10 demands on different preference781
levels for two negotiating agents and arbitrarily label P (in-between 0 and 10) of them782
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Figure 4: Success rate over the number of conflict-
ing demands
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Figure 5: Average rounds of reaching agreements over
the number of conflicting demands
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Figure 6: Success rate over the number of bargainers
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
The number of bargainers
A
v
e
ra
g
e
ro
u
n
d
s
 
 average rounds based on action function 1
average rounds based on action function 2
average rounds based on action function 3
Figure 7: Average rounds of reaching agreements over
the number of bargainers
as the conflicting ones. The negotiation is carried out in our fuzzy logic based model783
but based on action functions (1), (28), and (29), respectively. From Figure 4, we can784
see that the success rate of the model with action function (1) always keeps high when785
the conflicting demands are less than 10. However, the success rate of the one with786
action function (28) increases first and then decreases, and is lower than that of the787
one with action function (1) in all situations, especially when the number of conflicting788
demands is low or high, and the success rate of the model with action function (29) is789
the lowest one in all situations. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that in the model with action790
function (1), the average number of rounds in reaching agreements are the lowest.791
In the second experiment, we randomly generate 10 demands in different preference792
levels for M negotiating agents (in-between 2 and 20) and arbitrarily select 4 of them793
as the conflicting ones among all the negotiators. The negotiation will proceed until794
there are no conflicting demands, respectively. From Figure 6, we can see the model795
with action function (1) can maintain a high success rate of negotiation even when the796
number of negotiating agents increases, while the success rate will obviously decrease797
with the other two with action function (28) and action function (29). And Figure798
7 shows that the model with action function (1) can also keep lower rounds when799
reaching agreements.800
Therefore, according to the experiments, we have:801
Observation 1. If action function (1) is used in our fuzzy logic based model, it can802
guarantee not only a high success rate of negotiation but also a high efficiency when803
the numbers of conflicting demands and negotiating agents are increased.804
Here we should note that giving-up the upgrading direction change does not mean805
giving-up the representation of attitude towards risk, but just adjusting the method to806
improve the outcomes, because the attitude towards risk can also be represented by807
the preference change degree, and different preference change degrees lead to different808
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(c)
Figure 8: Average rounds of reaching agreements, the number of demands in agreement, the average pref-
erence levels of remaining demands in the first negotiating agent’s outcome with the number of conflicting
demands about effect of risk degree.
actions.809
6.2. The influence of negotiating agents’ attitude towards risk810
This subsection will experimentally analyse how negotiating agents’ attitudes to-811
wards risk influence the outcome of a negotiation procedure.812
We will use the measure of the average level number of remaining demands in a813
negotiating agents’ outcome in initial dynamic preference. A smaller average level814
number means a higher average level (i.e., a negotiating agent gains more of what815
he prefers) and a large average level number means a lower average level (i.e., a ne-816
gotiating agent gains less of what he really wants). In this experiments, we run the817
negotiation 1,000 times under the setting that every negotiating agent’s action function818
is formula (1) and the fuzzy rules are those in Table 2.819
We do three experiments to investigate the effect of attitude towards risk in three820
dimensions: (i) the average rounds to achieve agreements; (ii) the number of demands821
in agreement; and (iii) the average preference levels of remaining demands in certain822
negotiating agent’s outcome. We randomly generate 10 demands on 5 preference levels823
for two negotiating agents and arbitrarily label N (changing from 0 to 10) of them as824
their conflicting ones.825
In the first and second experiments, the negotiation is carried out in the fuzzy logic826
based model where both negotiating agents’ risk degrees are fixed in the three cases:827
(i) pγ1, γ2q “ p1, 1q, meaning that one risk seeker encounters another risk seeker;828
(ii) pγ1, γ2q “ p1,´1q, meaning that one risk-seeker encounters one risk averter; and829
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(iii) pγ1, γ2q “ p´1,´1q, meaning that one risk averter encounters another risk averter.830
From Figure 8(a), we can see that the average rounds to reach agreements is the831
lowest in the case that one risk averter encounters another risk averter in a negotia-832
tion procedure and is the highest in the case that one risk seeker encounters another833
risk seeker. From Figure 8(b), the number of consistent demands in agreement is the834
highest in the case that one risk averter encounters another risk averter in a negotia-835
tion procedure; and is the lowest when one risk seeker encounters another risk seeker.836
Moreover, in Figures 8(a) and 8(b), comparing the line of type “-ˆ-” with that of type837
“-˚-” and comparing the line of type “-˚-” with that of type “-¨-”, we can see that if a838
negotiating agent chooses to be a risk seeker, no matter whether his opponent is a risk839
seeker or a risk averter, the negotiation will take more time and the negotiating agent840
will get fewer demands than when he chooses to be risk averse.841
In the third experiment, we also model the cases similar to the first experiment,842
but the average preference levels of remaining demands in each negotiating agent’s843
outcome are different. Therefore, we carry out four cases as shown in third chart in844
Figure 8(c), and just draw the first negotiating agent’s situation. By comparing the line845
of type “-¨-” with that of type “-o-” and comparing the line of type “-ˆ-” with that of type846
“-˚-” type, we can see that if a negotiating agent is risk seeking, no matter whether his847
opponent is risk seeking or averse, his average preference levels of remaining demands848
is higher than that when choosing to be risk averse. That is, a risk seeker can gain more849
demands that he prefers than a risk averter.850
Therefore, according to the above analysis, we have:851
Observation 2. A risk seeking negotiating agent can gain fewer but more preferred-852
demands than a risk-averse one in the fuzzy logic based model.853
This is on line with what often happens in real life. For example, in stock markets,854
a high income often comes with a high risk [72].855
7. Benchmark with SCS856
This section analyses how well our model and its solution concept (i.e., DSCS)857
work compared with those of Zhang [34] (i.e., SCS).858
In the existing model, negotiating agents also do simultaneous concession; but un-859
like ours, their preferences do not change during the course of a negotiation and in860
every round all negotiating agents give up all the demands on the least preferred level.861
Formally, its negotiation process is defined as follows:862
Definition 12. Let tD1i , ¨ ¨ ¨ , DHii u be the partition of Di induced by equivalence re-863
lation „, which can be defined by preference ordering <i, where Hi is the height of864
the hierarchy. For convenience, Dąki is used to stand for
Ť
ląk Dli. The simultaneous865
concession solution’s (SCS) agreement of a negotiation procedure G is given by:866
ASCSpGq “
#
Dąµ1
Ť
. . .
Ť
Dąµn if µ ă H,
H otherwise, (30)
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where µ “ mintk | Ťni“1 Dąki is consistentu (i.e., µ is the minimal rounds of conces-867
sions of the procedure) and H “ mintHi | i P Nu.868
In this section, we will theoretically and empirically analyse the relation between869
our dynamically simultaneous concession solution (DSCS) process and the static one870
(SCS) [34].871
7.1. Theoretic Analysis872
Firstly, we get some theorems about the relation between the both concepts of so-873
lutions.874
Theorem 5. For two negotiation procedures G and G1 with the same inputs,875
(i) when ASCSpGq ,H, ADSCSpG1q ,H; but876
(ii) when ASCSpGq “ H, it is possible that ADSCSpG1q ,H.877
Proof. (i) If S SCSpGq , pH, . . . ,Hq, it means that Dλ ă H such that there is an agree-878
ment in the λ-th round by SCS, and all demands left of each negotiating agent are879
consistent with each other. By action function (1), only conflicting demands could be880
downgraded. Therefore, no matter how the dynamic preference of each negotiating881
agent changes, the demand set of all the negotiating agents from the first level to the882
pH ´ λq-th level will remain consistent. This means that the negotiation procedure can883
reach an agreement at least in the λ-th round by DSCS.884
(ii) We now consider two negotiation procedures with the same inputs. That is, the885
procedure contains two negotiating agents and each negotiating agent has ten demands,886
five of which are conflicting with those of the other negotiating agent. Moreover, a pair887
of conflicting demands from both the negotiating agents occurs at the top levels in both888
negotiating agents’ dynamic demand preference hierarchies (but no restrictions on orig-889
inal demand preference ordering). More specifically, we can depict such a procedure890
as follows:891
(a) N={1,2};892
(b) X1 “ ta, b, c, d, e, f , g, h, i, ju and X2 “ t a, b, c, d, e, f , g, h, i, ju;893
(c) a <p1q1 b <
p1q
1 c <
p1q
1 d <
p1q
1 f <
p1q
1 g <
p1q
1 h <
p1q
1 i <
p1q
1 j;894
(d)  a <p1q2  b <p1q2 c <p1q2 d <p1q2 f <p1q2 g <p1q2 h <p1q2  i <p1q2  j; and895
(e) FLS is the fuzzy system that is presented in Section 3.896
Notice that in the above we just require the demands placed in the first place in the897
preference orderings of both negotiating agents conflict with each other, such as a and898
 a, but without any restriction on other demands’ preference orderings. Then, in such a899
kind of negotiation procedures, ASCSpGq “ HŤ . . .ŤH “ H. However, by Theorem900
3, ADSCSpGq ,H. 901
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Figure 9: The success rate and the average rounds of reaching agreements, the number of demands in agree-
ment, and the average preference levels of remaining demands in the first negotiating agent’s outcome with
the number of conflicting demands.
This theorem indicates that our dynamically simultaneous concession process can902
improve the success rate of negotiation, which is an agreeable result for all the negotiat-903
ing agents. That is, if an agreement can be reached through the SCS process, it can also904
be reached through our DSCS process; but in some case where the SCS process cannot905
reach an agreement, our DSCS process is still able to reach an agreement. Therefore,906
in this sense our model is better than the SCS one in resolving conflicts among a set of907
agents.908
7.2. Empirical Evaluation909
We will also carry out three groups of experiments to analyse how the quality of910
outcomes changes with the number of conflicting demands, the number of bargainers911
and the number of preference levels, respectively. In addition to average rounds, the912
number of demands in agreement, and the average level of demands in outcome, we913
will introduce one more criteria to evaluate an outcome of a negotiation procedure: the914
success rate of negotiation. In these three experiments, we run the negotiation 1,000915
times under the setting that every negotiating agent’s action function is formula (1) and916
the fuzzy rules are those in Table 2.917
In the first experiment, 10 demands are randomly put on different 5 levels for two918
negotiating agents and we arbitrarily label N (P t0, 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 10u) of them as their con-919
flicting demands. Figure 9 shows:920
(i) The success rate of DSCS is higher than that of SCS, especially when the con-921
flicting demands are increasing. For example, when the number of conflicting922
demands is 9, the success rate of our model is about 50% higher.923
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Figure 10: The success rate and the average rounds of reaching agreements, the number of demands in
agreement, and the average preference levels of remaining demands in the first negotiating agent’s outcome
with the number of bargainers.
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Figure 11: The success rate and the average rounds of reaching agreements, the number of demands in
agreement, and the average preference levels of remaining demands in the first negotiating agent’s outcome
with the number of levels
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(ii) In DSCS the average rounds needed to reach agreements are higher than that of924
SCS because by DSCS in every round there is only one demand given up for925
every bargainer and then there will be more negotiation rounds.926
(iii) Using DSCS, the number of demands in agreement is larger.927
(iv) When the number of conflicting demands increases, the average preference level928
in a negotiating agent’s outcome using DSCS will be lower than that of using929
SCS.930
In the second experiment, we randomly generate 10 demands on 5 preference levels931
for M negotiating agents (in-between 2 and 10) and arbitrarily select 5 of them as the932
conflicting demands of all the negotiating agents. The negotiation will proceed in both933
models. Figure 10 shows:934
(i) DSCS can maintain a high success rate of negotiation even when the number of935
negotiating agents increases, while the success rate will obviously decrease using936
SCS.937
(ii) Since in every round there is only one demand given up by every negotiating938
agent by DSCS, it needs more rounds to reach agreement when using DSCS.939
(iii) More demands can be kept in the final agreement even when the negotiating940
agents increase using DSCS.941
(iv) When the number of negotiating agents increases, the average preference level in942
a negotiating agent’s outcome using DSCS will be lower than that of using SCS.943
In the third experiment, we randomly generate 10 demands in K (in-between 1 and944
10) preference levels for 2 negotiating agents and arbitrarily select 5 of them as the945
conflicting demands of all the negotiating agents. Figure 11 shows:946
(i) Using DSCS can maintain a high success rate of negotiation no matter what the947
number of levels is, while using SCS, the success rate is low when the number of948
levels is low and obviously increases when the number of levels increases.949
(ii) The rounds of reaching agreements by DSCS do not change as much when the950
number of demands levels changes, while using SCS, it increases when the num-951
ber of demands levels increases.952
(iii) More demands can be saved in the final agreement when the number of levels953
increases using DSCS.954
(iv) When the number of levels increases, the average preference level in a negotiating955
agent’s outcome using DSCS will be lower than that of using SCS.956
Therefore, according to the above analysis, we have:957
Observation 3. Although the average level of agreed demands using our DSCS model958
is lower than that of the SCS one, since reflecting a negotiating agents’ cognitive fac-959
tors of risk, regret, and patience, our DSCS keeps a higher success rate and a higher960
efficiency, and gets more demands left in an agreement, even when the number of con-961
flicting demands, negotiating agents or preference levels increase.962
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7.3. Comparison via an example963
When using SCS to solve the political negotiation problem in Section 5, the out-964
come is:965
ASCS,1pGq “ tCJOu,
ASCS,2pGq “ t LR, CJO, RTu,
and so the agreement of two parties is:966
ASCSpGq “ ASCS,1pGq
ď
ASCS,2pGq “ t LR, CJO, RTu.
By comparing (28) with (31), we can see that ours is more reasonable. In fact,967
the numbers of left demands of both parties and the agreement are not less than the968
ones using SCS. For example, through the SCS model, the negotiating agents have to969
give up the demands  FHC, BHR and IEI (which are demands consistent with both970
negotiating agents) as the cost of their negotiation risk attitudes. Moreover, sometimes971
the left demand set of a negotiating agent can strictly include the one using SCS, such972
as Parties 1 and 2 in this example. In addition, the agreement gained by our solution973
process reflects not only the negotiating agents’ risk attitudes but also the other human974
factors in a negotiation, such as patience and regret degree.975
This political example and the example in the proof of Theorem 5 in Section 7.1976
reveal one serious limitation of the SCS model: their concessions always begin from the977
lowest level in the ranking of a demand set and the negotiating agents never change the978
preference, so if some conflicting demands are on the top level then the bargain will979
be easily broken. However, in our model, the negotiating agents’ preference can be980
changed during the course of a negotiation, so the preferred but inconsistent demands981
can be moved down when the preference change degree is high enough. Thus, we982
can avoid an unreasonable outcome in the SCS model. To illustrate this issue more983
obviously, consider a simple negotiation setting with two negotiating agents whose984
initial preferences of the demands are as follows:985
a <p1q1 b,
 a <p1q2 b.
Using SCS will bring a disagreement, but by using our DSCS model, before the nego-986
tiation the two negotiating agents are allowed to change the static preference structure987
into the following initial dynamic preference structures:988
b <p1q1 a,
b <p1q2  a.
Thus, the negotiating agents can reach an agreement, i.e., tbu. Therefore, our negoti-989
ation process, on the one hand, can still reflect the negotiating agents’ attitude of risk990
like SCS, as well as other psychological factors that SCS cannot reflect; on the other991
hand, it avoids many negotiation-broken situations that would result from using SCS.992
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8. Related work993
In this section, we will discuss related work to show how our work advances the994
state-of-art in the relevant research fields. Specifically, we firstly compare our work995
with other fuzzy logic based negotiation models in Section 8.1. Secondly, we compare996
our models with some crisp logic based negotiation models in Section 8.2. Thidly, we997
discuss similarities and differences between our work and some consensus models in998
group decision making in Section 8.3. Finally, we discuss some other similar topics in999
Section 8.4, including opinion dynamics and dynamic preferences.1000
8.1. Fuzzy logic based negotiation models1001
In some negotiation systems, the methods of fuzzy logic have been used. In this1002
section, we will discuss these models one by one according to the ways in which they1003
used in negotiation and what kinds of fuzzy logic they employ.1004
8.1.1. Offer evaluation1005
In this sort of work, fuzzy rules are used for evaluating offers. For example, Kolom-1006
vatsos et al. establish a fuzzy logic based model for a buyer to decide to accept or reject1007
a seller’s offer according to the proposed price, the belief about the seller’s deadline,1008
the remaining time, the demand relevancy, and so on [73]. However, this model does1009
not show how the negotiating agents’ risk attitudes change their preferences, while ours1010
does via a fuzzy logic system. Moreover, although they do a lot of simulation experi-1011
ments to show their model’s advantages over other similar models, they have done little1012
theoretical analysis to reveal some insights into their model, as we do in this paper.1013
Zuo and Sun also use fuzzy logic to evaluate offers in the bilateral negotiation1014
model [74]. Moreover, they distinguish three attitudes of negotiating agents in three1015
concession strategies: greedy, anxious and calm. However, unlike our fuzzy logic1016
based model, their model does not deal with risk attitudes of the negotiating agents, and1017
their preferences on the demands are ranked by using real numbers. More importantly,1018
in this paper we theoretically analyse: (i) the affection of parameters in our fuzzy1019
system, (ii) the conditions under which our negotiation system can reach agreements,1020
and (iii) the relation of our negotiation outcomes with the ones gained via the other1021
work.1022
8.1.2. Offer generation1023
In this kind of work, fuzzy rules are used to generate offers or counter-offers during1024
the course of a negotiation. For example, Costantino and Gravio propose a new inter-1025
mediation model for analysing a possible strategic interaction in a supply chain [75].1026
There the output of the fuzzy inference engine is the degree to which a negotiating1027
agent should concede. The degree is calculated by using fuzzy rules, which is simi-1028
lar to the way of calculating the preference change degrees in our fuzzy logic based1029
model. However, their input parameters just include the offer in the previous round of1030
negotiation, the current contractual power and market penetration, but ignore negotiat-1031
ing agents’ risk attitudes. Moreover, they just do a case study, but few theoretical or1032
experimental analyses on their negotiation model. Nevertheless, we not only theoret-1033
ically reveal some critical insights into our model, but also do a lot of experiments to1034
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confirm the effectiveness of our model in terms of negotiation success rate, negotiation1035
efficiency and agreement’s quality.1036
Some other similar examples are as follows. Cheng et al. use fuzzy rules to repre-1037
sent negotiation strategies that generate offers or counter-offers during the course of a1038
negotiation [76]. This model also employs a simple heuristic to learn the preferences of1039
the other party, yet unlike ours their preference is not adjusted according to the progress1040
of a negotiation. Arapoglou et al. employ fuzzy rules to reason about a buyer’s next1041
action (possibly it is an offer generation) in a negotiation [77]. This work also discusses1042
how to generate these fuzzy rules automatically from data, whereas our work discusses1043
how to elicit fuzzy rules from humans via psychological experiments. Carbo et al. use1044
fuzzy rules for calculating counter-offers [78]. He et al. use fuzzy rules to determine1045
buyers’ offers (called bids) and sellers’ offers (called asks) in a continuous double auc-1046
tion (a special kind of negotiation) [79]. Other studies on this line include [80, 81].1047
However, negotiating agents’ preferences are not involved in these systems, and the1048
problem of fuzzy rule acquisition is not discussed, either; but both are our concerns in1049
this work. Yahia et al. use fuzzy rules for offer generation in negotiation for collabo-1050
rative planning in manufacturing supply chains [82]. Nonetheless, unlike our work in1051
this paper, their fuzzy rules are verbally formulated and the issue of negotiating agents’1052
preferences are dealt with very little.1053
Moreover, researchers also design some adaptive negotiation strategies based on1054
fuzzy rules. For example, in [83], for a grid resource negotiation Haberland et al. pro-1055
pose an adaptive negotiation strategy based on fuzzy rules for a client agent to adjust1056
its tactics to the tendency in resource availability changes (i.e., the overall direction1057
and average speed of Grid resource dynamism) during the course of a negotiation.1058
Although in sone sense it can be regarded as a kind of negotiating strategy that we1059
use fuzzy rules to adjust negotiating agents’ preference structure, the main difference1060
between ours and theirs is that our adjustment is according to the changes of users’ psy-1061
chologic factors of risk, patience, and regret during the curse of a negotiation, while1062
their is that of resource availability during a negotiation. In [84], Zhan et al. also1063
propose adaptive conceding strategies for negotiating agents based on interval type-21064
fuzzy logic and they use type-2 fuzzy rules to determine the change of strategies ac-1065
cording to the remaining time and opponents cooperative degree. However, fuzzy rules1066
there are predefined according to human intuitions, while the ones here are elicited via1067
psychological experiments.1068
In addition, in some work, fuzzy rules are used to generate offers for manual ne-1069
gotiation. For example, Oderanti et al. develop a fuzzy logic based decision support1070
system for human-human wage negotiation [25]. The inputs of their system are the1071
changes in inflation and business profit, and then by using a fuzzy rule base and strate-1072
gies, employers and employees can calculate the future wages. Therefore, their fuzzy1073
logic based system is not an automated negotiation one, as ours is. Moreover, theo-1074
retically they analyse little about their decision support system, but we do and further1075
show some advantages of our fuzzy logic based model.1076
8.1.3. Opponent analysis1077
There is a sort of work that equips a negotiating agent with fuzzy rules to analyse1078
the relevant information about his opponent in order to take proper actions during the1079
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course of a negotiation. For example, Kolomvatsos and Hadjiefthymiades propose a1080
fuzzy logic based model for a negotiating agent to estimate his opponent’s negotiation1081
deadline [85]. Their fuzzy rules are defined directly by human experts, while ours is1082
by the means of psychological experiments. Since it is difficult to let human experts1083
to define fuzzy rules directly, in order to overcome the difficulty, Kolomvatsos and1084
Hadjiefthymiades use a clustering algorithm to automatically generate a fuzzy rule1085
base [86]. This is actually a kind of machine learning method, which elicits the fuzzy1086
rule from data, while ours is from humans via psychological experiments.1087
8.1.4. Dynamic fuzzy rules1088
In the existing studies above, all fuzzy rules and the membership functions of all1089
the fuzzy variables in the rules remain unchanged during the course of a negotiation.1090
However, some researchers argue that they should be updated during negotiation in1091
order to adapt to dynamic negotiation information. For example, Kolomvatsos et al.1092
develop an adaptive fuzzy logic system for the buyer side in a negotiation with a seller1093
[87], which can update automatically by adding fuzzy rules and changing membership1094
functions when obtaining new information during a negotiation process. In particular,1095
in their fuzzy logic system, some new fuzzy rules will be added when the buyer’s1096
acceptance degree of a seller’s offer is equal to zero. Nevertheless, according to the1097
setting of our fuzzy rules, our fuzzy rules can cover different sets of values for input1098
parameters and there are no cases where an output is equal to zero. As a result, our1099
fuzzy logic system does not have the above problem. Moreover, our fuzzy rules are1100
elicited by means of some psychological experiments, which reflect the reality better1101
than theirs, because theirs are not via by any psychological experiment. In addition,1102
their fuzzy logic system is used for evaluating a seller’s offer and produce an acceptance1103
degree to which the seller’s offer should be accepted or rejected. However, our fuzzy1104
logic system is used as a sort of negotiation strategy tool and its output is a preference1105
change degree that determines which actions a negotiating agent should take to change1106
its preference structure.1107
8.1.5. Fuzzy constraint1108
Fuzzy constraints can be viewed as a special kind of fuzzy logic and some auto-1109
mated negotiation systems are developed based on fuzzy constraints. For example, Luo1110
et al. develop a fuzzy constraint-based negotiation system [2]. It actually is an instan-1111
tiation of well-known principled negotiation approaches [88] (i.e., negotiating based1112
on interest, seeking alternative by trade-off, and arguing by rewarding). Therefore, the1113
system has some nice attributes such as the capability of minimising information reve-1114
lation, ensure win-win outcomes (fair for both sides), and build a long term relationship1115
between sellers and buyers in order to generate long term profit. Nevertheless, in this1116
work there are no discussions about how to elicit user’s preferences modelled by fuzzy1117
constraints, and the negotiating agents’ preference structures remain the same during1118
the course of a negotiation. These are its main differences from our work in this paper.1119
Karim and Pierluissi also build up a negotiation model based on fuzzy constraints1120
for bilateral multi-issue negotiation [89]. The model contains two agents: (i) the in-1121
formation agent that stores and updates the information about the negotiation, and (ii)1122
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the negotiator agent that helps make a new price proposal according to buyer satisfac-1123
tion. The fuzzy constraints are used to calculate the agent’s satisfaction degree with1124
the opponent’s offer. However, there are some drawbacks in their model. For exam-1125
ple, their fuzzy rule base for satisfaction measurement is based on their own intuitions,1126
while our fuzzy rules are based on more reliable psychological experiments. More-1127
over, their simulation experimental analysis might not suffice to prove the quality of1128
their model because it is actually a case study, whereas we do a lot of experiments, in-1129
cluding benchmark experiments with a similar existing model (see Section 7). Another1130
study [90] similar to that of [89] is similarly different from ours.1131
Hsu et al. also develop a fuzzy constraint based negotiation system to solve dis-1132
tributed job shop scheduling problems [91]. They model the scheduling problem as1133
a set of fuzzy constraint satisfaction problems, interlinked by inter-agent constraints.1134
Their system can flexibly adopt competitive, win-win, and collaborative strategies, de-1135
pending on different production environments. Their experimental results show that1136
the proposed system is flexible and effective for job scheduling problems with unfore-1137
seen disturbances. However, their work is not concerned with the acquisition of fuzzy1138
constraints, while ours studied how to elicit fuzzy rules. This is also the difference1139
between our work and their another similar work [92].1140
In [31], Zhan et al. use fuzzy constraints to represent negotiation goals and accord-1141
ingly establish an offer evaluation method and a method for account-offer generation1142
by tradeoff. There are some significant differences between our work in the paper and1143
the one in [31]. First, negotiation issues in the previous work are in continuous do-1144
mains, while the current ones are in discrete domains. Second, there are no discussions1145
about how to acquire fuzzy constraints, here we propose a method to elicit fuzzy rules.1146
Third, there fuzzy constraints employed to set negotiation goals, while here we use1147
fuzzy rules to adapt the preference structure during the course of negotiation.1148
8.1.6. Others1149
Fuzzy logic approaches are also used to solve other problems in negotiation, for1150
example: (i) to predict the negotiation strategy of the opponent [93]; (ii) to calculate,1151
in negotiation, the need for a project according to received revenues, future business1152
opportunities, and levels of competition [94]; and (iii) to use uninorm aggregation op-1153
erators [95] to aggregate multiple pieces of evidence in automated legal argumentation1154
[96]. However, none of them uses fuzzy logic systems to update the preference during1155
a negotiation, as we do in this paper.1156
8.2. Crisp logic based negotiation models1157
Zhang and another Zhang propose a negotiation model based on propositional logic1158
[97]. In their model, negotiating agents’ preferences over demands in form of logic1159
propositions are presented in total pre-orders, and an agreement is reached by all the1160
negotiating agents’ minimal simultaneous concession. Later on, Zhang proves that the1161
solution is uniquely characterised by the five logical axioms of consistency, compre-1162
hensiveness, collective rationality, disagreement, and contraction independence [34].1163
Based on the work in [97, 34], Jing et al. propose a logical framework for negotiation1164
with integrity constraints [21]. Different from the work in [34], in their paper, integrity1165
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constraints are put into account in a negotiation procedure, i.e., the demand prefer-1166
ence structure of each negotiating agent is restricted by integrity constraints. Their1167
negotiation solution is constructed based on the hierarchies of demand structures under1168
integrity constraints, which can also be characterised uniquely by five logical prop-1169
erties of consistency, non-conflictiveness, disagreement, equivalence, and contraction1170
independence.1171
However, the studies [97, 34, 21] all have the following limitations, which we re-1172
move in this paper:1173
(i) In the models proposed in [34, 21], the concept of a solution meets the axiom of1174
disagreement. The axiom actually says that a negotiation should reach no agree-1175
ments if one of the negotiating agents has no more demands left before other1176
negotiating agents reach an agreement. However, even if all the demands of that1177
agent are given up, the others should be allowed to still continue the negotiation1178
and reach an agreement together because whatever they reach has no conflict with1179
that agent’s empty demand set left. In this case, we cannot say it is unfair for that1180
agent who got nothing left, because giving up each demand fully depends upon1181
his/her preference and his/her strategy of adjusting preference during a negotia-1182
tion. That is, it is his/her own choice and so he/she cannot complain. Moreover, in1183
another negotiation, if one negotiating agent gets one demand in the final agree-1184
ment but each of other negotiating agent gets 100 demands, then the models in1185
[97, 34, 21] regard this as acceptable, but obviously this is almost as unfair as the1186
former case. As a result, in this paper we just assume a solution should satisfy1187
logical axioms of consistency, collective-rationality, and minimum-concession,1188
but do not have to satisfy the axiom of disagreement because the axiom is not1189
always reasonable in real life.1190
(ii) They all neglect the fact that a negotiating agent may need to change its prefer-1191
ences during the course of a negotiation because a fixed preference setting will1192
more easily lead to a disagreement. In fact, their concessions always begin from1193
the lowest level in the ranking of a demand set and the negotiating agents never1194
change the preference. As a result, when some conflicting demands are on the1195
top levels, the negotiation will be easily broken. For example, if two negotiating1196
agents’ preference structures are as follows:1197
a <1 b,
 a <2 b,
then their models get no agreements. However, our model can solve this problem1198
by updating the demands preference according to the preference change degree1199
that is drawn from some fuzzy rules. Therefore, in our model we can get agree-1200
ment tbu from the above example.1201
(iii) Their models cannot reflect how the other human factors (such as regret and pa-1202
tience) effect upon the outcome of a negotiation procedure, but as we argue in1203
the introduction section it is necessary to put these human factors into the ac-1204
count of building up an automated negotiation. Rather, we take these factors into1205
consideration and study how these factors influence the outcome.1206
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(iv) In their model, when a negotiating agent makes concession, the agent has to give1207
up all the demands on the lowest level, which is not always reasonable. For ex-1208
ample, if a negotiating agent has 100 demands on his lowest level while another1209
just has one, then the first one has to give up 100 demands, but the second just1210
needs to give up one. Obviously, it is unfair for negotiators in equal positions, so1211
that it is hard to imagine that their models will be accepted in real-life. Rather,1212
in our model, every negotiating agent just gives up one demand in each negotia-1213
tion round. Moreover, in this way our model gains not only a higher negotiation1214
success rate but also more consistent demands in the final agreements, as our1215
empirical analyses revealed (see Section 7.2 for details).1216
Vo and Li also build an axiomatic negotiation model, in which a negotiation sit-1217
uation is described in logic language and the preference over outcomes is ordinal1218
[98]. Their solution satisfies the axioms of fairness, unbiasedness and unanimously1219
efficiency (stronger than Pareto Efficiency). However, unlike our model, their model1220
does not reflect the negotiating agents’ risk attitudes and patience, which are very im-1221
portant factors for negotiation in real life; and their preference cannot change during a1222
negotiation process, either. None of these problems exists in our work in this paper.1223
There are some automated negotiation systems in which various kinds of crisp logic1224
have been employed. For example, Liu et al. use description logic in an automated trust1225
negotiation [99]. In this kind of negotiation, in order to establish mutual trust between1226
two strangers, the two need to exchange sensitive resources iteratively. The exchange1227
processes are protected by accessing control policies, which are formalised in the de-1228
scription logic [99] or first order predicate logic [100]. Therefore, their crisp logic1229
based negotiation systems is quite different from ours: they use crisp logic to express1230
policies that control resource exchanging in a negotiation process (simply crisp logic is1231
used to control negotiation procedures), while we use crisp logic to express the objec-1232
tives (demands) being negotiated and use fuzzy logic to control negotiation procedures.1233
Some more examples of using various kinds of crisp logic to control negotiation pro-1234
cedures include: defeasible logic is used to express the negotiation strategies [101];1235
and a BDI-like logic is proposed and used to support the agent’s negotiating behavior1236
[102]. In addition, Ragone et al. employ a kind of propositional logic as communica-1237
tion language among negotiating agents [90]. In our model, propositional logic is used1238
to express negotiation objectives, fuzzy logic is used to update negotiators’ preference1239
structure of negotiation objectives, and in each round each negotiating agent gives up1240
one demand (negotiation objective) without communication.1241
8.3. Consensus process1242
A consensus process among a group decision makers is somewhat analogous to1243
a negotiation process. Hence, we will compare our model with those in the area of1244
consensus process in this subsection.1245
8.3.1. Concept1246
As shown in [103], group decision making is a process in which different decision1247
makers gather together to analyse a problem so as to obtain a solution among the alter-1248
natives. And one of the important aims of group decision making is to improve the level1249
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of consensus. Here consensus can be understood as a full and unanimous agreement,1250
i.e., every decision maker fully agrees with a collective outcome. Hence, a consensus1251
process is required during the course of group decision making, in which the decision1252
makers change their opinions step by step towards to a consensus. From this point of1253
view, a consensus process can also be viewed as a special kind of negotiation process,1254
in which the aim of negotiators is to find out a mutually acceptable level of consensus.1255
Even though the purpose of consensus process and negotiation process is similar1256
in the aspect of resolving conflict among a group of different agents, the definitions1257
of conflicts in these two processes are not exactly the same. In a consensus process,1258
the conflict refers to the differences among individual preference structures, which re-1259
flect different opinions of different decision makers. Hence, a consensus aims to change1260
decision-makers’ individual preferences over different solution alternatives towards the1261
collective one, and then improve the level of consensus among all the decision makers1262
involved. However, in a negotiation process, the conflict refers to the dissatisfaction of1263
opponents’ offers. In particular, in our multi-demand negotiation model, the conflict1264
lies in the conflicting demands, rather than preferences over demands. If one agent’s1265
proposal during a negotiation includes a demand that is conflicting with other agent’s1266
demand, then the proposal is not accepted. In other words, although the preferences1267
over demands of different agents are different, they is also reach an agreement. Hence,1268
the aim of our negotiation process is to find an agreement, in which there are no con-1269
flicting demands, meanwhile keeping as many demands as possible for agents.1270
Due to the different meanings of conflict in consensus and negotiation, their meth-1271
ods for conflict resolution are also different. More specifically, in a consensus process,1272
different decision makers discuss and share their knowledge about the problem and ex-1273
press their opinions about the preference over different alternatives of solutions. Then a1274
moderator agent will work out a solution and compute the level of consensus by using1275
some measure approaches according to the information of decision makers’ prefer-1276
ences. If the level of consensus is higher than a certain threshold, then the consensus1277
process ends; otherwise, the moderator agent gives some feedbacks to all the decision1278
makers and advice them to change their opinions. In a negotiation, different negotiat-1279
ing agents have different thresholds of the level of agreement, which are represented by1280
the utility values or acceptability. For our multi-demand negotiation in this paper, the1281
acceptable threshold is that there is just no conflicting demands in an offer. Hence, the1282
negotiation ends when a negotiating agent accepts its opponent’s proposal, rather than1283
a predefined consensus level is achieved.1284
8.3.2. Model1285
Some consensus models aim to handle different kinds of preference representation1286
structures. For example, Dong et al. [104] propose a framework for group decision1287
making problems with heterogeneous preference representations: preference orderings,1288
utility functions, additive preference relations and multiplicative preference relations.1289
Their model also takes the effect of decision makers’ psychological behaviours into1290
consideration. Actually, they employ prospect theory [105] to reflect decision makers’1291
psychological behaviours for reaching consensus in group decision making. Similar to1292
their work, in this paper, we also consider the effect of humans’ psychological factors1293
in negotiation, such as the attitude towards risk, regret and patience. However, the1294
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methods for reflecting human factors are different between our model and theirs. They1295
employ the prospect theory to reflect some psychological phenomena, such as reference1296
dependence, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion [105], while we use fuzzy logic1297
rules to represent how attitude towards risk, regret and patience influence the preference1298
over demands. In their model, decision makers involved can represent their preference1299
structures on alternatives in the four forms, while we use total pre-order as the only1300
form to represent the preference over an agent’s demands.1301
There are also other kinds of preference in consensus models. For example, Wu1302
and Chiclana [106] also propose a consensus model for group decision making prob-1303
lems. However, different from the hereinbefore work, they pay more attentions to the1304
uncertainty of preference information of decision makers involved. Specifically, to1305
deal with the situation where decision makers cannot compare different alternatives,1306
they employ an appropriate representation of intensity of preference over alternatives,1307
which is called intuitionistic reciprocal preference relation. In this model, decision1308
makers employ intuitionistic fuzzy sets to represent the degree to which one alternative1309
is preferred to the other one, and the degree to which one alternative is non-preferred1310
to another. However, our model does not deal with this kind of uncertain preference1311
structure, but unlike ours they do not concern dynamic preference structure. Xu et1312
al. [107] propose a consensus model based on hesitant fuzzy preference relations. In1313
their consensus process, there are two feedback mechanisms to update experts’ prefer-1314
ences, the interactive mechanism and the automatic mechanism, which are employed1315
in different situations where experts are willing or unwilling to offer their updated pref-1316
erences. However, in our negotiation model, every negotiating agent updates its pref-1317
erence according to the effect of human factor, which is based on the reasoning of a1318
fuzzy logic system. Wang and Lin [108] propose a consensus model with another pref-1319
erence structure, interval reciprocal preference relations. In their model, they develop1320
ratio-based similarity measurement for interval reciprocal preference relations and an1321
induced interval-valued cross-ratio ordered weighted geometric to aggregate interval-1322
valued cross-ratio information. However, unlike our negotiation model, they do not1323
consider human factors, while we take the attitudes towards risk, patience and regret1324
into consideration during the course of negotiation.1325
Some studies are interested in changing the decision makers’ weights when obtain-1326
ing their collective preference structure. For example, Dong et al. [109] summarises1327
several non-cooperative behaviours in consensus process and then propose a group de-1328
cision making framework to adaptively change the decision makers’ weights according1329
to their behaviours in the previous consensus round. However, our model is different1330
from theirs in several aspects. Firstly, normally an evaluation of one negotiator to an-1331
other cannot change the opponent’s negotiation power or negotiation strategies during1332
the course of negotiation; while the values of decision makers can influence the consen-1333
sus process and selection process in group decision making. Hence in their framework,1334
they can accelerate the speed of consensus process by changing the values of decision1335
makers; while a negotiation framework promotes the negotiation process according to1336
negotiators’ strategies. Secondly, in their model the decision makers update their pref-1337
erence relations during a consensus process according to a reference point, but in our1338
model negotiators change their preference structures according to their regret degree,1339
patience degree and risk attitudes during a negotiation.1340
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The consensus model proposed by Dong et al. [110] also deal with the weights1341
of the decision makers and attributes involved. This model supports the process of1342
preferences-modifying, which seeks to minimise the adjustment amounts (in the sense1343
of Manhattan distance) between the original and adjusted preferences. They also pro-1344
pose other two consensus models with the weights-updating function. However, our1345
negotiation model is different in the following two aspects. (i) Our preference modify-1346
ing function is based on a fuzzy logic system, but theirs is not. And (ii) in our model1347
each demand is the same important and so is each negotiator; while in their model, dif-1348
ferent decision makers involved are important differently and so are different attributes.1349
There are some other models dealing with the relationship between decision mak-1350
ers involved. Wu et al. [111] proposed a novel consensus model to improve the degree1351
of consensus among the decision makers by providing appropriate advice to the incon-1352
sistent ones. However, we aim to find mutually acceptable demand set through the ne-1353
gotiation dynamically simultaneous concession solution. Another difference between1354
ours and theirs is that different negotiating agents in our model are at an equal, fair1355
position in negotiation, whereas their work takes the different importances (weight) of1356
decision makers into consideration. If there are social relationships between the negoti-1357
ating agents, then they may elaborate together to damage the utility of other negotiators1358
[112]. Hence, it is better for the negotiating agent to obtain similar information in a1359
negotiation. Liu et al. [113] propose a trust induced recommendation mechanism for1360
decision makers to get personalised advices only from others they trust. In their model,1361
the consensus degree is used to indicate the degree of consistency of a decision maker1362
in a group, rather than measuring the overall level of consensus of all decision mak-1363
ers’ preferences. Their model can well balance the original opinion of experts and the1364
improvement of consensus degree. However, in our model, negotiating agents do not1365
try to balance their initial preferences and the dynamic one. As long as it is good for1366
reaching an acceptable agreement, the negotiating agents update their preferences.1367
Besides various models of dealing with the trust relation among decision makers1368
in a consensus process [113, 114, 111], there are others to improve the likelihood of1369
implementation of recommendations for inconsistent experts. For example, Wu and1370
Chiclana [115] propose a visual information feedback mechanism for group decision1371
making. Based on the visualised information about consensus level before and after1372
implementing the recommended values, the decision makers can consider to what ex-1373
tent they should make the recommendations. However, in our model, the negotiating1374
agents are not allowed to see the others’ preference structures; otherwise, the agents1375
could benefit itself, which may lead to a unfair outcome of a negotiation [2].1376
In addition, some researchers study how to handle incomplete and dynamic infor-1377
mation in a consensus process. For example, Dong et al. [116] propose a consensus1378
model to deal with a complex and dynamic multiple attribute group decision making1379
problem that different decision makers use individual sets of attributes to evaluate the1380
individual alternatives, and both the individual sets of attributes and the individual sets1381
of alternatives change dynamically in a consensus process. Moreover, in a consen-1382
sus process, the model can generate adjustment recommendation for individual sets of1383
attributes, individual sets of alternatives and individual preferences. Nevertheless, in1384
our model, the negotiating agent can only adjust the preference ordering and give up1385
the least preferred demand, rather changing the demands in every round of negotia-1386
46
Page 47 of 60
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
tion. Moreover, unlike ours they do not take the effect of any human psychological1387
factor into consideration when changing preference like we do. Zhao et al. [117] pro-1388
pose model that can cope with incomplete, linguistic preference relations, and consider1389
both the individual consistency and group consensus when aggregating the collective1390
linguistic preference relation. However, our preference over demands just is a total1391
pre-order rather than the one represented by linguistic terms.1392
8.4. Other relevant topics1393
There are also other topics relevant to this paper in the area of multi-agent system,1394
such as opinion dynamics and dynamic preferences. We will briefly discuss them in1395
this subsection.1396
8.4.1. Opinion dynamics1397
Opinion dynamics investigates the process of formation and evolution of certain1398
opinions among groups of agents. This problem attracted wide attention of researchers1399
from different fields, such as mathematics [118], statistical physics [119], multi-agent1400
systems [120], and so on. They try to figure out what conditions (i.e. the rules that1401
agents interact with each other and the ways that agents update their opinions) can1402
lead to either a consensus or diversity in the final stage. For example, Acemoglu and1403
Ozdaglar [121] investigate the influence of social learning when leading different opin-1404
ions to consensus. Dong et al. [122] study the necessary and sufficient conditions under1405
which the agents can form a consensus based on leadership. In order to put the influ-1406
ence of biases into account, Sobkowicz [123] proposes an opinion dynamics model1407
based on cognitive biases. However, the study focuses of opinion dynamics and nego-1408
tiation are different. In our model, negotiating agents reach a consistent agreement by1409
making concessions to the opponents. Although different negotiating agents may still1410
have conflicting opinions of demands (for example, one supports a policy and another1411
opposes it), they have to concede to each other for reaching an agreement, thereby1412
gain the important demands they desire. That is, the negotiation process is not con-1413
cerned with the formation and evolution of opinions, but focuses on agents’ conceding1414
behaviours for reaching an agreement.1415
8.4.2. Dynamic preferences1416
Generally speaking, the dynamic preference refers to the process in which partic-1417
ipants adjust their preference values according to some factors. For example, in the1418
group decision making model of Dong et al. [104], some decision makers can dynami-1419
cally update their preference evaluation according to the feedbacks during a consensus1420
process. Liu [124] proposes a recommendation model to capture users’ dynamic pref-1421
erences by Gaussian process. Karahodza et al. [125] employ an improved user-based1422
collaborative filtering algorithm to utilise the changes of users’ dynamic preferences1423
over time. In our model, a negotiating agent has two preferences over demands: one is1424
static (used to represent agent’s original demand preference) and the other is dynamic1425
during the course of negotiation. However, the change of dynamic preferences in our1426
model is different from the above existing models. It consists of two steps: (i) to give1427
up the least preferred demands in dynamic preference orderings, and (ii) to adjust the1428
sequence of demands in dynamic preference orderings.1429
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9. Conclusion1430
So far, not much work on automated negotiation has dealt with multi-demand in1431
discrete domains, although in real life this kind of negotiation problem is very common1432
and important. Moreover, in some situations it is necessary to take human psycholog-1433
ical characteristics into account when building an automated negotiation system. In1434
addition, sometimes it is necessary for negotiating agents to change their preference1435
structures during the course of a negotiation. To address these issues, this paper devel-1436
ops a novel model of negotiating multi-demand in discrete domains, which reflects well1437
human psychological characteristics about risk, patience and regret. More specifically,1438
in our model, the degrees to which a negotiating agent should change his preference1439
structure according to the risk, patience and regret, is calculated via some fuzzy rules,1440
which we employ psychological experiments to elicit. We also axiomatically charac-1441
terise the calculation of our fuzzy rules’ input parameters. Moreover, by theoretical1442
analyses, we reveal: (i) how human psychological characteristics about risk, patience1443
and regret change their preference structures during the course of a negotiation; and (ii)1444
under which conditions the agreement of a bilateral negotiation can be reached. And1445
through empirical analysis, we further figure out how attitudes towards risk influence1446
the outcome of a negotiation; and show how our fuzzy logic based model outperforms1447
a well-known model in terms of negotiation success rate, efficiency and quality. In1448
addition, we also illustrate our model by solving a negotiation problem in the domain1449
of politics.1450
Much more could be done in the future. For example, since psychological studies1451
reveal human factors have a significant impact upon the result of a negotiation, we can1452
extend our model to reflect more psychological characteristics. On the one hand, it1453
can help improve the performance of automated negotiation; on the other hand, just1454
as Wooldridge has argued that putting human factors into consideration can help game1455
theory to predict human behavior better [126], it can be used to better predict human1456
negotiation behaviours to support manual negotiation or human-computer negotiation.1457
It is also interesting to integrate more concession strategies in continuous domains1458
(e.g., those that Pan et al. proposed [127]) into negotiation models in discrete domains.1459
Moreover, in this paper we suppose different agents cannot collaborate with each other1460
in private, then our simultaneous concession solution do not consider the problem of1461
coalition among agents. However, it is significant and interesting to take coalition1462
problem into consideration to avoid manipulation by coalitions and make a negotiation1463
more fair to all the agents involved in a negotiation. In addition, it is worth studying1464
under which conditions the negotiation that is impacted by various human factors will1465
produce Pareto-outcome, and how to elicit more accurate fuzzy rules that are used in1466
negotiation models.1467
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Highlights 
 
 The concept of dynamic preference is introduced into negotiation models in 
discrete domains to reflect a negotiator’s adaptability during the course of a 
negotiation, so that negotiation success rate, efficiency and quality can be 
increased significantly.  
 
 A new negotiation algorithm is designed, which have many advantages over 
previous ones. 
 
 A set of fuzzy logic rules are identified by lots of psychological experiments, and 
the rules can be used to update negotiators’ preferences in each negotiation round 
according to their degree of regret, initial attitude to risk, and patience.  
 
 A theoretical work has been done to show how users’ psychological 
characteristics about regret, risk and patience influence their changing 
preferences during the course of a multi-demand negotiation, and under which 
conditions an agreement can be reached.  
 
 Computer simulation experiments are carried out to analyse the rationale for the 
choice of action function in our model, the influence of input parameters in the 
fuzzy system, as well as the negotiation success rate, efficiency and quality of 
our method. 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